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Agency-Apparent Authority and Agency by Estoppel: lEmerging Theo-
ries of Oil Company Liability for Torts of Service Station Operators
The average American motorist has no way of knowing what busi-
ness arrangement exists between the operator of the local service station
he patronizes and the "brand name" oil company whose products the
station sells. Yet, in the past the nature of this business relationship has
been determinative on the issue of the liability of the oil company for
the torts of its operators because courts have consistently refused to hold
the oil company liable unless a master-servant or principal-agent rela-
tionship invoking respondeat superior could be established., Recently,
however, in Gizzi v. Texaco, Inc.2 the court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit looked to the apparent relationship between the oil company and
dealer and upheld apparent authority and agency by estoppel' as
grounds for jury consideration of oil company liability.
In Gizzi plaintiffs Gizzi and Giaccio (a passenger) were injured in
an expressway collision when the brakes failed on a van bought by Gizzi
from a Texaco operator on the day of the accident. As an incident to
the sale of the van, the Texaco dealer had repaired the brakes. Both
plaintiffs sued Texaco' for personal injury under theories of apparent
agency and agency' by estoppels citing Texaco's national advertising
portraying its dealers as being skilled in automotive servicing, evidence
of acquiescence by Texaco in the sale of used cars by this and other
dealers, and evidence of a sign on the premises that indicated the pres-
'Annot., 83 A.L.R.2d 1282 (1962); see Annot., 116 A.L.R. 470 (1938).
1437 F.2d 308 (3d Cir.) (2-I decision), cert. denied, 92 S.Ct. 65 (1971).3For purposes of this note, no attempt is made to distinguish between theories of apparent
authority and agency by estoppel. Some writers contend that apparent authority is based on
estoppel and that the two theories are substantially coextensive. P. MECHEM, OUTLINES OF THE
LAW OF AGENCY §§ 85-90 (4th ed. 1952). Others argue that apparent authority is founded upon
the objective theory of contracts and that apparent authority and agency by estoppel are distin-
guishable on grounds such as the estoppel requirement of change of position (for example, execu-
tory contracts are said to be enforceable under apparent authority but not estoppel); the origins of
estoppel being in tort, apparent authority in contract; and enforceability by the principal.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8, comment d at 32-33 (1957) [hereinafter cited as
RESTATEMENT]; W. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 8E (1964). However, all seem
to agree that in most cases the elements of both theories are present and any differences are
immaterial. RESTATEMENT § 8, comment d at 32-33.
4The station operator was not a defendant in the action. 437 F.2d at 309.
5The plaintiffs also alleged actual agency, but no actual authority for the sale of the van was
found by the trial court or the appellate court. Id.
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ence there of an "Expert foreign car mechanic.'' 6 Especially singled out
was Texaco's slogan "Trust your car to the man who wears the star."7
The district court ruled that plaintiffs had not introduced sufficient
evidence to warrant submission of the issues of apparent authority (or
actual authority) to the jury and directed a verdict in favor of Texaco.
On appeal the Third Circuit, in viewing the evidence in a light most
favorable to plaintiffs, found that reasonable men could differ as to
whether Texaco had clothed its dealer with apparent authority to repair
and sell vehicles and remanded the case to allow the jury to consider
this question of fact."
Prior to the Gizzi decision, in cases involving the asserted liability
of oil companies for acts of their service station operators, the courts
had relied exclusively upon the doctrine of respondeat superior Under
this doctrine the courts examine the degree of "control" 10 or "right to
control"" between the company, as master or principal, and the dealer,
as servant or agent. The focal points in the respondeat superior analysis
are the written contract and, with varying emphasis, the working rela-
tionship. Relevant factors include who owns title to the business, how
the dealer is compensated, who controls the retail price, and whether the
oil company has the power to terminate the sales agreement, to with-
draw essential equipment, or to control the station employees (especially
in their day-to-day conduct).2 Findings vary widely 3 because of differ-
ences of opinion as to how much control is necessary to invoke respon-
'Id. at 310.
7Id.
'In remanding for jury consideration the issues of apparent authority and agency by estoppel,
the court made clear that it found no "overwhelming case of liability." Id.
'Annot., 83 A.L.R.2d 1282 (1962); see Annot., 116 A.L.R. 470 (1938).
"A distinction is typically drawn between control over details of the work and mere control
over the result to be achieved. See, e.g., Miller v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 268 F.2d 114, 118 (5th Cir.
1959).
""One of the main criterions, if not the chief one, as to whether the relationship of respondeat
superior exists, is the right to control, and it is not a question as to whether that control is actually
assumed but whether it exists." Greene v. Spinning, - Mo. App. _ 48 S.W.2d 51, 57
(1931).
"Comment, Master and Servant-The Filling Station Operator as an Independent Contrac-
tor, 38 MICH. L. REV. 1063, 1070 (1940); Annot., 83 A.L.R.2d 1282, 1284-85 (1962).
13For the purpose of tort liability the courts seem to differ over the extent to which
they will be influenced by the factors surrounding the relationship de hors the written
contract between the [filling station operator and the oil company] . . . .The myriad
factual combinations possible with varying degress of economic control complicate the
problem of forecasting the result in any particular situation.
Comment, 38 MICH. L. REV., supra note 12, at 1072.
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deat superior and because of the profusion of types of arrangements
between oil companies and dealers."
The courts were consistent prior to the Gizzi decision in not accept-
ing apparent authority or agency by estoppel as grounds for oil company
liability. Before 1952, according to one authority,'5 no oil company had
ever been held liable under an estoppel theory arising from its apparent
ownership of its service stations. 6 Nor has the pattern changed: no
plaintiff has been successful in recovering from the oil company purely
under theories of apparent authority or agency by estoppel since then.
The courts rejected these theories on various grounds such as the fact
that no evidence existed as to why plaintiff patronized the station and
hence there was no evidence of reliance; 7 that it was common knowl-
edge that trademark signs were displayed by independent contractors; 8
that signs were not a "holding out" by the oil company but only an
indication that its products were sold; 9 and that newspaper advertise-
ments referred only to the sale of specific products depicted and created
no apparent authority or agency by estoppel with respect to brake re-
pairs."0 Cawthon v. Phillips Petroleum Co.21 is perhaps a representative
case and was based on facts not unlike those in Gizzi. In Cawthon
plaintiff sued under theories of apparent authority and agency by estop-
pel (in addition to the usual actual agency theory) for injuries resulting
from a faulty repair of his brakes. Plaintiff stressed the display of oil
company signs, signs indicating "Brake Service" and "Mechanic on
Duty," general advertising, and especially the slogan "Come to your
Phillips 66 Dealer for all the things you need to help your car perform
"For example, Texaco owns and operates stations, leases land owned by Texaco to "indepen-
dent dealers," and leases land from third parties for operation of service stations by "independent
dealers." In other situations, the dealer leases land directly from the third party. Brief for Appel-
lants at 16-17, Gizzi v. Texaco, Inc., 437 F.2d 308 (3d Cir. 1971). All of these basic arrangements
are subject to further variation in the individual contracts.
'P. MECHEM, supra note 3, § 442.
"6Actually in Standard Oil Co. v. Gentry, 241 Ala. 62, 1 So. 2d 29 (1941), an isolated case,
the court in affirming a judgment against the oil company held that it was for the jury to determine
whether or not the oil company was estopped from denying liability. However, special facts existed
in that case in that plaintiff had patronized the station previously when it was operated by the oil
company, and his testimony tended to show that his reason for transferring his business back to
this station was "an unsatisfactory experience with an independent operator and a desire to do
business with a more responsible party." Id. at 64, 1 So. 2d at 31.
"Miller v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 278 F.2d 114, 118 (5th Cir. 1959).
"Reynolds v. Skelly Oil Co., 227 Iowa 163, 171, 287 N.W. 823, 827 (1939).
"
9Sherman v. Texas Co., 340 Mass. 606, 608, 165 N.E.2d 916, 917 (1960).
2 Cawthon v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 124 So. 2d 517, 521 (Fla. Ct. App. 1960).
21124 So. 2d 517 (Fla. Ct. App. 1960).
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at its best." The photograph that accompanied Phillips' advertisement
in which the slogan was used depicted only products sold outright by
Phillips to the dealers, and the court found any representation to be
limited to "things" for sale. The court found neither a solicitation of
mechanical or repair services nor an assertion of agency in Phillips'
advertising and affirmed a summary judgment in favor of the oil com-
pany.
While Gizzi breaks this pattern of rejection of apparent authority
and agency by estoppel, its handling of the traditional elements of the
two theories poses some problems. Gizzi is somewhat at odds with
apparent authority cases in other business settings in its handling of the
reliance factor (in this case plaintiffs' belief and reliance on Texaco's
"standing behind" the sale and repair of the vehicle by its dealer).
Traditionally, the plaintiff must have relied upon the principal's indicia
of authority2 (in Gizzi upon Texaco's advertising, signs, and the "for-
eign mechanic" sign). Proof that his reliance is justifiable and reasona-
ble is an essential element of the plaintiff's case 23 and he has the burden
of proof.24 The court did make a cursory reference to reliance by plain-
tiff Gizzi but there was no mention of reliance by plaintiff Giaccio
(the passenger) at all in the opinion.26 Allowing Giaccio to take his case
to the jury on remand, riding the coattails of Gizzi's reliance, would
seem to broaden the scope of potential oil company liability beyond that
encompassed by traditional concepts of apparent authority.2
"Bowman v. Home Life Ins. Co. of America, 260 F.2d 521, 523 (3d Cir. 1958).
13RESTATEMENT §§ 27, 267. The court in Gizzi cites § 267 with respect to reliance:
One who represents that another is his servant or other agent and thereby causes a third
person justifiably to rely upon the care or skill of such apparent agent is subject to
liability to the third person for harm caused by the lack of care or skill of the one
appearing to be a servant or other agent as if he were such.
RESTATEMENT § 267.
""However, it is part of plaintiff's case to prove some element of reasonable reliance." W.
SEAVEY, supra note 3, § 90.
""Appellant Gizzi testified that he was aware of the advertising engaged in by Texaco and
that it had instilled in him a certain sense of confidence in the corporation and its products." 437
F.2d at 310.
16The only references to Giaccio in appellants' brief aside from general references of reliance
by "plaintiffs" are that Giaccio also patronized the service station in question, was present when
there were discussions in regard to the vehicle purchased, and was at the station when the vehicle
was actually picked up. Brief for Appellants at 27, 32.
2RESTATEIENT § 8, comment e at 35, illustration i1, gives this example:
The Ace Taxi Company employs no drivers but merely receives orders from pro-
spective passengers and puts "Ace Taxi Company" on cabs owned and operated by
independent drivers. One of those drivers collides negligently with another automobile,
damaging one of its passengers who reasonably believes the Taxi Company to be the
[Vol. 50
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Closely related to the reliance issue is a problem raised by Gizzi
with regard to scope of apparent authority. That is, based upon the
representations of the oil company to the public, what range of activities
by the dealer might a motorist reasonably surmise to be authorized by
the company? This aspect of Gizzi seemed most to bother the trial
judge" and the dissenting judge29 who felt that no reasonable man could
believe that Texaco would authorize and stand behind the repair and
sale of a used vehicle and, therefore, that the case should not go to the
jury. What constitutes a sufficient factual issue to take the case to the
jury is perhaps the critical question in all apparent authority cases
reaching for a "deep pocket." In a recent case, Wallach v. Williams,"0
the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed a decision that no factual issue
of apparent authority was posed for the jury when a motorist fueling
his car at a service station was struck by an automobile negligently
driven by a station attendant. The court, however, specifically reserved
for determination in an "appropriate" case the question whether the
negligence of an independent contractor or his employees3' might be
employer. The Taxi Company is liable to the passenger but not to the owner of the other
automobile.
"The Third Circuit opinion quoted the district court judge:
"In short, nobody could reasonably interpret any of these slogans or representations or
indicia of control as dealing with anything more than the servicing of automobiles, and
to the extent of putting gas in them and the ordinary things that are done at service
stations.
"That 'Trust your car to the man who wears the star' could not possibly be con-
strued to apply to installing new brake systems or selling used cars."
437 F.2d at 310 (district court opinion unreported).
"The majority relied in part on RESTATEMENT § 267. The dissenting judge stressed the last
part of comment a to § 267:
"This rule normally applies where the plaintiff has submitted himself to the care or
protection of an apparent servant in response to an apparent invitation from the defen-
dant to enter into such relations with such servant. A manifestation of authority consti-
tutes an invitation to deal with such servant and to enter into relations with him which
are consistent with the apparent authority."
437 F.2d at 311, quoting RESTATEMENT § 267, comment a at 578 (emphasis by the judge).
-52 N.J. 504, 246 A.2d 713 (1968).
"If apparent authority is relied on, it follows that oil companies would be liable for torts of
employees of the service station operator (and not just the operator), since it is the motorist's
reliance on the oil company's indicia of authority or invitation that establishes liability. Under the
respondeat superior approach, if a principal-agent or master-servant relationship is found between
the oil company and the service station operator, the oil company is likewise liable for subemploy-
ees:
Where the immediate question is the status of some subemployee or subagent of
the [service station operator], it is generally true that his status, in relation to the
producing company, follows that of the . . . service station operator, the same general
1972]
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imputed to an oil company when it appears to the ordinary motorist that
the oil company is operating the station or is sufficiently in control to
extend an invitation to the public to buy the products or services there."2
Policy grounds underlying apparent authority and estoppel as op-
posed to respondeat superior seem distinguishable in certain areas. One
writer cites what he calls the "lip service" paid by the courts to the
control test as the basis for respondeat superior as "an attempt to
correlate the doctrine with the general rule of tort liability, that of
fault. '33 Apparent authority and estoppel have no such connection
with fault: "Like apparent authority, [estoppel] is based on the idea that
one should be bound by what he manifests irrespective of fault ..... ,,'
The "enterpriser's risk"' 35 theory of respondeat superior contrasts with
both the apparent-authority idea of a party's being bound by the reason-
able expectations he creates" and the similar (some say identical) es-
toppel notion that as beteween two innocent parties the burden is placed
on the one whose misleading manifestations have created reliance and
change of position. However, the "deep pocket" rationale, which is
often characterized as the true explanation behind the doctrine of res-
pondeat superior, might be said to apply equally to apparent authority
and agency by estoppel, at least in the oil company setting. Thus appar-
ent authority could be a second avenue to achieve a social policy of risk
distribution with respect to injury caused by service station operators.
The oil company is clearly in the best position to assess the business
risks of social harm involved in its operation and to distribute the risk
to the public through its prices. Indeed, the dealer ordinarily has no
capacity to allocate the risk to the public through what he charges.
Prices are usually governed by the oil company with the dealer receiving
a commission based on sales. The advantage of apparent authority as a
factors being determinative.
Annot., 83 A.L.R. 2d 1282, 1285 (1962).
3The court cited RESTATEMENT § 8, comment e at 35, illustration II. 52 N.J. at 506, 246
A.2d at 714. Illustration II is set out in note 27 supra.
"Comment, 38 MICH. L. REv., supra note 12, at 1064-65.
31RESTATEMENT § 8, comment d at 33.
5"Society imposes vicarious liability on the employer because his selection and direction has
put the employee in a situation where the wrong occurs and because he is the enterpriser who has
assumed the risks of gain or loss from the employee's work activities." Conant, Liability of
Principals for Torts of Agents: A Comparative View, 47 NEaB. L. REV. 42 (1968).
"Apparent authority "is that authority which, through [sic] not actually delegated to the
agent, the principal intentionally or inadvertently causes third persons to believe the agent to
possess." Conant, The Objective Theory of Agency: Apparent Authority and the Estoppel of
Apparent Ownership, 47 NEB. L. REv. 678, 681 (1968).
[Vol. 50
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means of reaching the "deep pocket" is that problems occasioned by the
"control" test of untangling complex oil company-dealer relationships
are avoided.
On the other hand, as Texaco argued, allowing an issue of apparent
authority to go to the jury on the quantum of evidence presented in Gizzi
may require oil companies not only to revamp their national advertising
but also to refuse to allow their dealers to repair or sell autos unless
those activities are stringently controlled by the oil companies. "For if
Texaco and other companies must become the guarantors of the non-
negligent performance of such services, then they must exercise control
over the conduct of their dealers in performing them." 7 Such control
would seem to violate a federal policy of preserving the independence
of the retail service station dealer,38 and the oil companies might run
the risk of antitrust prosecution if the dealer had no voice in determining
what products or services he would offer.39 These arguments notwith-
standing, the oil company should not enjoy the benefits of chain-store
marketing methods and national identification with its station operators
without assuming concomitant social responsibilities. Moreover, it is
debatable whether the dealer is truly independent today. In addition,
liability has long been imposed on grounds of apparent authority and
estoppel in other business contexts."
In summary, one might conclude that apparent authority and
agency by estoppel do represent appropriate theories of oil company
liability. Gizzi breaks with the traditional pattern in recognizing that the
jury should have the opportunity to consider apparent authority in addi-
tion to the "control" arguments of respondeat superior. The problem
is that Gizzi may represent an outer limit with respect to what reasona-
ble men could agree on as being within the apparent authority created
by the oil company's manifestations to the public. It cannot reasonably
be assumed that the oil company "holds out" its dealer with respect to
'Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 6-7, Gizzi v. Texaco, Inc., 437 F.2d 308 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 92 S.Ct. 65 (1971).
"The importance of the small retailer in our economy is difficult to overstate. In
the gasoline industry, he is the competitive entity that bears the greatest proportionate
risk and earns the lowest return on investment. As a small businessman, an individual
entrepreneur, his welfare is of particular concern to this Commission. Interference with
his right to compete as he chooses and unlawful practices that blunt the effect of his
efforts and tend to cause his elimination are matters calling for public intervention.
FTC, REPORT ON ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES IN THE MARKETING OF GASOLINE 40
(1967).
39Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 9.
'OP. MECHEM, supra note 3, §§ 424-25, 442.
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each and every activity the dealer undertakes, and the sale and repair
of a used vehicle would seem to be on the borderline. Likewise, sending
the passenger's (Giaccio's) case to the jury without any showing of
reliance on his part seems unjustified under traditional approaches to
apparent authority. Whatever the jury outcome on remand (assuming
Gizzi is not later overturned), the Third Circuit has now cracked the
door that had barred from the jury plaintiffs suing oil companies under
theories of apparent authority and agency by estoppel. In so doing, it
has removed the greatest obstacle to recovery from the oil companies
under those long dormant theories.
CHARLES R. BRITT
Bankruptcy-Filing Fee Subjected to Constitutional Test
In 1892 Congress faced "the question whether this Government,
having established courts to do justice to litigants, will admit the
wealthy and deny the poor entrance to them."' Congress responded by
enacting an in forma pauperis statute granting indigents access to fed-
eral courts without prepayment of fees or costs. 2 When Congress later
adopted the present Bankruptcy Act in 1898, 3 it made specific provision
for an in forma pauperis proceeding.4 This allowed an indigent debtor5
to file a voluntary petition in bankruptcy and receive a discharge from
his debts without payment of the filing fee. In 1946, however, Congress
1H.R. REP. No. 1079, 52d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1892).
2Act of July 20, 1892, ch. 209, 27 Stat. 252 (now 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1970)). For a general
discussion of this statute, see Duniway, The Poor Man in the Federal Courts, 18 STAN. L. REV.
1270 (1966).
'Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544.
'Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, §§ 40a, 51(2), 30 Stat. 556, 558; General Order 35(4), 172
U.S. 665 (1898). The General Orders in Bankruptcy, adopted by the Supreme Court in 1898
pursuant to § 30 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 554, are designed to explain,
amplify, and apply the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act and have the full force of law except as
they conflict with the Act. The General Orders may be found as amended to December 31, 1970,
in the appendix to 11 U.S.C. (1970).
sThe in forma pauperis provision in the Bankruptcy Act from the beginning seems to have
been generally interpreted as meaning that a pauper is one totally without assets and available
credit. See, e.g., In re Medearis, 291 F. 709 (W.D. Tex. 1923); In re Collier, 93 F. 191 (W.D. Tenn.
1899). However, somewhat different standards of indigency were applied in Sellers v. Bell, 94 F.
801 (5th Cir. 1899), and In re Plimpton, 103 F. 775 (D. Vt. 1900). See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
1 51.04, at 1876-77 (14th ed. 1971). For a general discussion on in forma pauperis petitions in




abolished these pauper petitions in bankruptcy' and added a provision
allowing the petitioner to pay the filing fee in installments over a six-
to nine-month period. 7 Congress further provided that all installments
must be paid in full before the bankrupt is eligible for a discharge. 8 In
a recent district court case, In re Kras, the validity of this mandatory
fee scheme was successfully challenged on due process grounds.,"
At present, a filing fee of fifty dollars must accompany each volun-
tary bankruptcy petition. This figure represents the sum of three sepa-
rate filing-fee provisions found in the Bankruptcy Act: section 40c(1)"
provides that a thirty-seven dollar filing fee shall go into the Referees'
Salary and Expense Fund; 2 section 48c'3 provides that a filing fee of
ten dollars shall be paid to the trustee of the bankrupt's estate for the
'Act of June 28, 1946, ch. 512, 60 Stat. 323. Congress abolished the pauper petitions in
bankruptcy by deleting § 51(2) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 558; General Order
35(4), 172 U.S. 665 (1898).
7Act of June 28, 1946, ch. 512, 60 Stat. 323. Provisions for paying the filing fee in installments
are now found in the Bankruptcy Act § 40c(l), 11 U.S.C. § 68(c)(1) (1970); General Order 35(4).
Although § 40c(l) does not even mention in forma pauperis petitions, it is sometimes cited as
support for the contention that Congress intended to abolish the informa pauperis procedure in
bankruptcy proceedings. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 959, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1946).
RBankruptcy Act §§ 14b, 14c(8), 40c(l), 59g, 11 U.S.C. § 32(b), 32(c)(8), 68(c)(1), 95(g)
(1970); General Order 35(4). The preceding sections have been collectively interpreted as making
the payment of the filing fee a prerequisite to receiving a discharge, even in the case of an indigent
who is unable to pay such a fee. Some of the sections were amended after 1946 so to provide.
1331 F. Supp. 1207 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), prob. juris. noted, 92 S. Ct. 955 (1972) (No. 71-749).
10The actual holding in In re Kras was that the mandatory fee scheme deprived the indigent
petitioner of "his Fifth Amendment right of due process, including equal protection." Id. at 1212.
Three other decisions involving the same issue as In re Kras have made similar reference to "equal
protection" even though a federal statute-the Bankruptcy Act-was involved. In In re Smith, 323
F. Supp. 1082, 1088 (D. Colo. 1971), the court noted that
[bjy characterizing the problem presented in this case as one of equal protection,
we do not mean to suggest that fifth amendment due process takes in all of fourteenth
amendment equal protection. It is enough to note that fifth amendment due process does
include an equal protection principle ....
In In re Garland, 428 F.2d 1185 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 966 (1971), the court noted
that although the petitioner alleged a denial of due process, it would consider this allegation in
terms most favorable to the petitioner by regarding it as a "claim of lack of equal protection." Id.
at 1186. And in In re Naron, 334 F. Supp. 1150 (D. Ore. 1971), the court simply based its holding
on equal protection principles without referring to the fifth amendment. Id. at 1151. For Supreme
Court cases suggesting the existence of equal protection principles in the fifth amendment, see
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 624-42 (1969); Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964);
Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
"Bankruptcy Act § 40c(l), II U.S.C. § 68(c)(1) (1970).
"See text accompanying note 23 infra.
3Bankruptcy Act § 48c, II U.S.C. § 76(c) (1970).
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services the trustee renders;" and section 52al5 provides that a filing fee
of three dollars shall be paid to the clerk of the bankruptcy court. 6 This
substantial filing fee is in keeping with the traditional and continued
congressional expectation that the federal bankruptcy system be entirely
self-supporting. 7
Until the Bankruptcy Act was amended in 1946 by the passage of
the Referees' Salary Bill, 8 referees were not paid for their services from
public funds but rather were directly compensated by their statutory
share of this filing fee. Under this so-called fee system, a debtor was
permitted to file a voluntary petition without the payment of the usual
filing fee if his petition was accompanied by an affidavit stating that he
was without and could not obtain the money to pay such a fee. However,
he could ultimately be ordered to pay the filing fee if later there were
satisfactory proof that he could pay or obtain the money to pay." This
"General Order 15 provides that a trustee need not be appointed in no-asset cases. In the
districts where this is followed, the fee would be only $40 in no-asset cases. Bankruptcy Act § 48c,
II U.S.C. § 76(c) (1970); General Order 15. In some jurisdictions, the $10 is simply refunded to
the bankrupt. Silverstein, A Proposal to Waive Bankruptcy Fees in Certain No-Asset Cases, 52
A.B.A.J. 649 (1966).
"Bankruptcy Act § 52a, I I U.S.C. § 80(a) (1970).
"Bankruptcy law is administered by the federal district courts which sit as "courts of bank-,
ruptey." Bankruptcy Act § 1(10), 11 U.S.C. § 1(10) (1970). The filing of a voluntary petition
operates as an automatic adjudication of bankruptcy, Bankruptcy Act § 18f, II U.S.C. § 41(l)
(1970), and as an application for a discharge (although a formal application for a discharge is
required for corporate debtors, it is not required for individual petitioners), Bankruptcy Act § 14a,
I I U.S.C. § 32(a) (1970). Traditionally, federal bankruptcy proceedings have served two principal
purposes: (1) the equitable distribution of the debtor's assets among his general creditors, and (2)
the release of the honest but unfortunate debtor from his debts, in order to afford the debtor a
fresh start in life. See Note, Discharge Provisions in Consumer Bankruptcy: The Need for a New
Approach. 45 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1251 (1970). This latter purpose is accomplished by means of a
discharge, a term defined in the Bankruptcy Act § 1(15), 11 U.S.C. § 1(15) (1970). The court will
grant a discharge to a petitioner unless a creditor of the bankrupt, the trustee, or a representative
of the United States Attorney General, Bankruptcy Act § 14b(2), 11 U.S.C. § 32(b)(2) (1970),
raises a timely objection and establishes one of the eight exclusive statutory reasons for denying a
discharge that are found in the Bankruptcy Act § 14c, I I U.S.C. § 32(c) (1970).
'
7Sheaffer, supra note 5, at 1206.
"Act of June 28, 1946, ch. 512, 60 Stat. 323. For a general discussion of the bill see Horsky,
The Referee Salary Bill of 1946, 52 Com. L.J. 7 (1947). Before 1946 the referee's compensation
consisted of his share of the filing fee and a percentage of the bankrupt's assets, if any, that were
to be distributed to creditors. Herzog, The Referee in Bankruptcy: A Judge in Search of a Name,
75 CoNi. L.J. 37 (1970). Also, an indemnity fund provided reimbursement to the referees for actual
expenditures in operating their offices; however, this fund was often depleted and some referees
were forced to finance their offices with personal funds. H.R. REP. No. 1937, 79th Cong., 1st Sess.
1-2 (1945).
"Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 51(2), 30 Stat. 558; General Order 35(4), 172 U.S. 665
(1898). It was also recognized that the filing fee might be waived altogether in an appropriate case.
E.g., Sellers v. Bell, 94 F. 801, 817 (5th Cir. 1899).
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latter procedure was intended to prevent abuse of the pauper petition
by the bankrupt. In practice, however, it was used by many referees to
demand payment of their fees before they would grant a discharge, 20
whether the bankrupt was able to pay or not. But in all cases the old
fee system placed a referee in the unfair position of having to make a
decision-whether to demand or waive the filing fee-that would di-
rectly affect his own compensation. 2'
The Referees' Salary Bill of 1946 abolished this fee system22 and
provided that as of 1947 all filing fees that formerly went directly to
individual referees would go instead into a centrally operated fund 2 out
of which each referee would be paid an annual salary. Thus the total
fees collected by each referee became unrelated to his individual in-
come. 4 This bill did not, however, alter the well-established self-
supporting aspect of the bankruptcy system; it simply shifted the financ-
ing from the unit of the individual referee's office to a central fund that
would operate on a nationwide basis.
In the same legislation, Congress noted the deficiencies of the pau-
per petition provision and decided that in lieu of the "widespread prac-
tice of [referees] demanding payment ultimately," it would be more
appropriate to abolish pauper petitions and "to provide for installment
"See S. REP. No. 959, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1946). One may often encounter the phrase
"the judge may order," when in fact statutory amendments to the Bankruptcy Act now allow either
the referee or the judge of the district court to make such an order. For an interesting discussion
of both the history and the present roles of the judge and referee in bankruptcy, see Herzog, supra
note 18.
2 1H.R. REP. No. 1037, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1945).
22Mr. Royal E. Jackson, the Chief of the Division of Bankruptcy in the Administrative Office
of the United States Courts, has noted:
Is there any logical reason why the expense of a protracted antitrust case shall be paid
out of general funds of the Treasury, yet a bankruptcy. . . proceeding, large or small,
must pay its own way? There is none. But it was the only system the Congress would
buy in 1946. The proponents of the Act recognized. this, and they designed a system that
would work well in normal (non-inflationary) times.
Jackson, Bankruptcy Admninistration Then and Now, 45 AM. BANKR. L.J. 249, 275 (1971).
"The 1946 bill actually established two centrally operated funds that were consolidated into
the Referees' Salary and Expense Fund by a 1959 amendment, Act of July 28, 1959, Pub. L. No.
86-110, 73 Stat. 259. See H.R. REP. No. 242, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-3 (1959).
2 One writer has observed that even though the referees were placed on annual salaries,
the self-supporting system still burdened the referee with a pecuniary interest in every
case coming before him. He is never permitted to forget that the bankrupts' filing fees
and the assets of the bankrupt estate are paying his salary; and he is reminded by the
Judicial Conference that unless he collects what is due the Referees' Salary and Expense
Fund, he will be regarded as personally liable for the omission.
Jackson, .vupra note 22, at 274-75.
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payments in meritorious cases. '2 5 Although Congress may have antici-
pated that providing for payment by installments would help some
"meritorious" bankrupts, today most referees dislike the prospect of
collecting fees in installments and therefore restrict the availability of
this method of payment as much as possible." But even the bankrupt
who is allowed to pay in installments runs the risk that if for any reason
he misses a payment on one of the scheduled dates, his petition will be
dismissed.2 7
With these 1946 congressional changes, bankruptcy courts became
the only federal courts in which filing fees could not be waived upon a
showing of poverty.2 Moreover, because they are unique as the only
federal courts required by Congress to operate on a financially self-
sustaining basis, 29 the filing fee exacted of the bankruptcy petitioner
greatly exceeds that charged for instituting any other type of proceeding
in the federal courts, 30 despite the fact that bankruptcy proceedings
exist primarily for the purpose of affording relief to those who are
insolvent or unable to pay their debts as they mature.
Three federal courts31 have recently been confronted with the sta-
tutory argument that by its own language the general federal in forma
pauperis statute should apply to bankruptcy proceedings. Further, it
2S. REP. No. 959, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1947). This reasoning has been criticized because
"it ignores the fact that with the fee system gone, there would be no reason for a 'widespread
practice of demanding payment ultimately.'" Shaeffer, supra note 5, at 1209.
"Fullerton, Filing Fees in Installments, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTH SEMINAR FOR REFER-
EES IN BANKRUPTCY 527 (1968).
"Bankruptcy Act § 59g, II U.S.C. § 95(g) (1970); General Order 35(4). A referee has no
discretion to extend the time for installment payments beyond the nine-month maximum period
as provided in General Order 35(4)a. See, e.g., In re Barlean, 279 F. Supp. 260, 261 (D. Mont.
1968).
IThe general federal in forma pauperis statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1970), applies to all other
types of proceedings in the federal courts.
2A recent Brookings Institute study on bankruptcy has noted:
Bankruptcy alone among [federal judicial] proceedings is self-supporting of salaries and
other administrative expenses ....
The general pattern of financing court proceedings in the United States since about
1800 has been to have the public assume the costs of maintaining the courts. . . . We
can only conclude that, as long as bankruptcy is a judicial process and as long as other
judicial processes are conducted at public expense, it is manifestly unfair for the parties
in bankruptcy to bear the costs.
D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEMS, PROCESS, REFORM 192-93 (1971).
laThe typical filing fee in civil cases is set at $15 by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (1970).
311n re Garland, 428 F.2d 1185 (lst Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 966 (1971); In re Kras,
331 F. Supp. 1207 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), prob. juris. noted, 92 S. Ct. 955 (1972) (No. 71-749); In re
Smith, 323 F. Supp. 1082 (D. Colo. 1971).
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was argued, the Bankruptcy Act should be liberally construed because
of its broad remedial purpose. And since the Bankruptcy Act fails to
provide for those who are unable to pay the filing fee and also nowhere
expressly prohibits in forma pauperis proceedings, the courts should
construe the general in forma pauperis statute as being applicable in
bankruptcy.3 2 All three courts rejected this argument, concluding that
both the intention of Congress 33 and a reading of the Bankruptcy Act
itselP dictate that the filing fee must be paid in full before any bank-
rupt is eligible for a discharge.
These same three courts next considered the constitutionality of
this mandatory fee scheme as applied to indigents seeking a discharge
in bankruptcy. In re Kras 35 is the latest in this recent series of federal
court rulings on this constitutional question. In re Garland,36 a court
of appeals decision, came first, followed by a district court opinion in
In re Smith.3 7 Each case came from a different judicial circuit.3 8 The
essential facts and arguments presented in Garland, Smith, and Kras are
identical. In each an indigent petitioner stated that he presently did not
have the requisite filing fee and that he could not honestly promise to
pay it in installments over a nine-month period.
The court in Garland noted that it regarded bankruptcy as being
basically an administrative rather than a judicial proceeding and that
the filing fee was a reasonable expenditure for the financial services
rendered the petitioner in bankruptcy. The court rejected the petitioner's
due process argument 39 and held that a bankruptcy discharge was not
a fundamental right but rather a privilege" Congress had chosen to
3
'Arguments along this same line have also been suggested in Shaeffer, supra note 5, at 1203
n.5; 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 51.01, at 1873-74 (14th ed. 1971).
"H.R. REP. No. 1037, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 ( 1945); S. REP. No. 959, 79th Cong., 2d
Sess. 7 (1946).3
'Bankruptcy Act §§ 14b, 14c(8), 40c(1), 59g, 11 U.S.C. § 32(b), 32(c)(8), 68(c)(1), 95(g)
(1970); General Order 35(4). See note 8 supra.
331 F. Supp. 1207 (E.D.N.Y. 1971),prob.juris. noted, 92 S. Ct. 955 (1972) (No. 71-749).
,428 F.2d 1185 (Ist Cir. 1970), cert. denied,'402 U.S. 966 (1971).
31323 F. Supp. 1082 (D. Colo. 1971).
"Since In re Kras was decided, another district court from still a different judicial circuit
was confronted with the same constitutional attack on the mandatory filing fee in bankruptcy
proceedings. That court, relying heavily on the reasoning of Smith and Kras, ruled that the filing
fee, as applied to the indigent petitioner before it, "violates the principles of equal protection of
the laws." In re Naron, 334 F. Supp. 1150, 1151 (D. Ore. 1971).
11428 F.2d at 1187. The court indicated that it would have reached the same result had the
caes been argued on equal protection grounds. Id. at 1186. See note 10 supra.
"
0In several cases the Supreme Court has rejected the right-privilege dichotomy as a significant
factor for determining the constitutionality of a statute. E.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,
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bestow on those willing to "experience some slight burden in return."',
The Smith court pointed out that the main purpose of our bank-
ruptcy system is to enable debtors to obtain a judicially approved dis-
charge from their obligations. Noting that the fifth amendment includes
an equal protection principle, the court expressly rejected Garland's
reasoning and held that the mandatory filing fee as applied to an indi-
gent petitioner was a violation of equal protection.12 The court conceded
that although bankruptcy, standing alone, may not be a fundamental
right, "what is at stake here is not simply bankruptcy, but access to
court. So viewed, the question takes on a greater significance, at least
for those of us who are trained in the law and who regard the legal
system as fundamental to our way of life. ' '43 Continuing, the court
noted that
if a state or the federal government were to condition the enforcement
of all statutory and common law rights upon the payment of a $5,000
filing fee, access to court as we now conceive it would be severely
impaired. . . . Since to a person without funds, $50 may foreclose
access as surely as $5,000 [,] the amount of the fee is of no particular
meaning unless de minimus [sic].4
Kras, which reached the same result as Smith, has special signifi-
cance in this series of three cases because only it was decided after
Boddie v. Connecticut.4 5 In Boddie the Supreme Court ruled that it was
a denial of due process for a state to deny indigents access to the state's
divorce courts solely because of their inability to pay filing fees and
262 (1970); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 n.6 (1969); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
404 (1963). See also Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional
Law. 81 HARV. L. REv. 1439 (1968).
4428 F.2d at 1188. The Garland decision seemed to be grounded on what the First Circuit
apparently considers to be at stake in a bankruptcy proceeding:
The primary question must be why an individual admitting no assets has need for
a discharge. If he has nothing. . . it would seem that his creditors would find it pointless
to pursue him. If they should pursue, one would wonder what the debtor could have to
be concerned about. We can think of only two classes of seemingly assetless persons who
might want a discharge: those who in fact have assets, but hope to conceal them, and
those who have none, but . . . expect future assets, and wish to be rid of their creditors
first. The first category deserves, of course, no consideration. We do not think the claim
of the second so compelling that they must be constitutionally entitled to a free dis-
charge.
Id. at 1187-88.
12323 F. Supp. at 1086-89. See note 10 supra.
'lId. at 1087.
"Id. at 1089.
45401 U.S. 371 (1971).
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process costs. Justice Harlan, writing for the majority, observed that
"this court has seldom been asked to view access to the court as an
element of due process."4 But, he added, due process requires "that
absent a countervailing state interest of overriding significance," a state
must grant access to its courts to persons who are forced to resort to
the judicial process for resolution of their claims.17
Although the court in Kras was free to make its own assessment
of what a proper interpretation of Boddie would require with respect to
the indigent petitioner before it, the court was nevertheless confronted
with the Supreme Court's post-Boddie refusal to review In re Garland."
The Kras court simply stated that the Supreme Court's denial of certior-
ari was not to be taken as a decision of Garland on the merits49 and that
it remained "free to chart its own course." The court in Kras noted,
however, that this course was not "without guideposts, particularly in
view of the statements"5 of Justices Black and Douglas, who had dis-
sented (along with Justice Brennan) from the denial of certiorari in
Garland."
Justice Black suggested that the Supreme Court's unwillingness to
review Garland only two months after Boddie had been handed down
perhaps was prompted by a desire to proceed "slowly step by step, so
that the country will have time to absorb [Boddie's] full import. '52 But
both Justice Black and Justice Douglas were for reversing Garland's
holding outright, Justice Black noting that Boddie was grounded on the
sole premise that no person should be denied access to any court solely
because of his inability to pay a fee.53 Justice Douglas expressed his
approval of the majority's conclusion in Boddie that marriage and its
dissolution were so fundamental as to require the states to allow indi-
111d. at 375.
471d. at 377. Justice Brennan, in a concurring opinion, disagreed with that part of the majority
opinion which attempted to limit the holding in Boddie to similar divorce actions. He noted that
such a limitation would not withstand analysis, because "[i]f fee requirements close the courts to
an indigent he can no more invoke the aid of the courts for other forms of relief than he can escape
the legal incidents of marriage." Id. at 387. See also The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARV.
L. REV. 40, 104, 113 (1971).
"402 U.S. 966 (1971).
4 Accord, C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW of FEDERAL COURTS 495 (2d ed. 1970) (a
denial of certiorari "means [only] that, for whatever reason, there were not four members of the
Court who wished to hear the case").
50331 F. Supp. at 1211.
"




NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
gents access to divorce courts without paying costs, but he expressly
disavowed establishing a "hierarchy of interests" when indigency is
involved. Thus Justice Douglas concluded that Garland should have
been reversed, since obtaining a fresh start in life through bankruptcy
is an equally fundamental interest that should come under the shelter
of the equal protection clause. s4
The court in Kras agreed with the above reasoning of Justices
Black and Douglas and with the Smith court's proposition that the
interest at stake was the fundamental one of access to court, and con-
cluded "that a proper interpretation of Boddie requires that, as applied
to petitioner herein, the statutory requirement of prepayment of a filing
fee to obtain a discharge in bankruptcy violated his Fifth Amendment
right of due process, including equal protection." 5
The appellants seeking a divorce in Boddie were allowed to proceed
without payment of any fees. The courts in Kras and Smith granted the
petitioner the same relief but with the qualification that the referee
below should provide for the survival of the petitioner's obligation to
pay the filing fee since indigency is not necessarily a permanent condi-
tion. The court in Smith thought that this continuing obligation to pay
not only was appropriate and constitutionally permissible "but [also
would] further the congressional purpose of making the bankruptcy
system, insofar as possible, self-supporting."5
Although Kras and Smith represent a partial departure from the
expectation of Congress that the bankruptcy system be self-supporting,
it should be noted that since 1965 the system has not in fact supported
itself. It was predicted that in the fiscal year of 1971 the deficit in the
Referees' Salary and Expense Fund would amount to 4,750,000 dollars,
twice that of the 1969 fiscal year.57 The Judicial Conference of the
United States recently advocated the abolition of the self-financing sys-
tem in bankruptcy, noting that this aspect of bankruptcy is "outdated
111d. at 961.
5331 F. Supp. at 1212. Although another district court in In re Naron, 334 F. Supp. 1150
(D. Ore. 1971), agreed that access to court was a fundamental interest and based its similar holding
on equal protection, it noted that even though Boddie had been grounded on due process, it could
"think of no relevant due-process reason for attempting to distinguish between the right to be
judicially freed from an unwanted spouse and the right to be judicially liberated from harassment
by general creditors." Id. at 1152. See notes 10, 38 supra.
0323 F. Supp. at 1093.
"REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES,
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS 24, 201 (1970).
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and that it is no longer possible to maintain adequate payments into the
[Referees' Salary and Expense Fund] without placing an inordinate
burden upon bankrupts and the assets of bankrupt estates. '5 8 Given the
obvious circumstance that bankruptcy, by its very nature, is the least
likely among the.types of civil proceedings to be able to take on any
additional "burden," the steps taken by the courts in Kras and Smith
seem desirable in that this burden is shifted to society in general, bring-
ing bankruptcy in line with other civil actions in which the smaller fees
collected only begin to cover the cost of operating the federal courts.59
Congress presently has before it legislation that would abolish the
self-financing aspect of bankruptcy.6" Enactment of this legislation
could possibly open the door to future congressional action aimed at
alleviating the indigent petitioner's plight in bankruptcy proceedings. If,
however, Congress refuses to change the already faltering self-
supporting policy of the present bankruptcy system, it seems reasonable
that this policy could be adequately served by statutorily excluding the
government's claim for these administration costs from the scope of a
discharge without making nonpayment a ground for denying the bank-
rupt relief from his other obligations. The government already protects
its own interest in certain taxes owed it by the bankrupt by including
these taxes in section l a's list of "exceptions" to a discharge-debts
that remain outside of and thus not affected by a discharge.61 In sharp
contrast to the treatment afforded taxes, nonpayment of the filing fee
is presently included in section 14c's list of "objections" to a dis-
charge-the effect of a valid objection being that the petitioner is not
entitled to a discharge at all.12 The government's interest in taxes is
analogous to its interest in the administration costs in bankruptcy that
are provided by the filing fee. Since the government already protects its
interest in taxes by providing that taxes remain outside a discharge, it
seems reasonable that it could similarly protect its interest in these
administration costs. Thus the government's claim for the filing fee
could be treated simply as an additional exception to a discharge under
-Jd. (1969), at 23-24.
5
'Silverstein, supra note 14, at 650.
0aH.R. 4816, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); S. 1394, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); see Jackson,
supra note 22, at 275.
"Bankruptcy Act § 17a, 11 U.S.C. § 35(a) (1970).
"
2 Bankruptcy Act § 14c, 11 U.S.C. § 32(c) (1970). See note 16 supra. If any one creditor
prevails with a § 14c objection to a discharge, the debtor will not get any discharge at all. In
contrast, a § 17a exception to a discharge affects only that creditor whose claim qualifies under
§ 17a, and the debtor is given a discharge from all his other creditors.
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section 17a rather than as a section 14c objection to a discharge. This
is, in effect, what the courts in Kras and Smith have done, and these
two cases are an important step toward making the bankruptcy dis-
charge the substantial debtor remedy it was intended to be.
SIDNEY L. COTTINGHAM
Communications-The Fairness Doctrine: A Continuing Advance into
Product Advertising
The fairness doctrine, a product of administrative regulation and
judicial decision, has long served to guarantee full discussion of public
issues in the nation's communications media.' Briefly stated, the doc-
trine imposes an affirmative obligation upon licensed radio and televi-
sion stations to present information advocating all points of view in the
discussion of controversial issues of public importance.2 A salient force
for many years, the fairness doctrine has acquired increasing relevance
and expanded meaning during the past decade.
In Friends of the Earth v. FCC- the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit' recently continued this judicial trend by
holding the fairness doctrine applicable to the presentation of television
commercials advertising high-powered automobiles and leaded gasoline.
The petitioning environmentalists5 contended that the advertisements
advanced the opinion that use of these products leads to a richer and
more enjoyable life. Facing undisputed scientific evidence of the envi-
ronmental dangers resulting from this use, the court overturned a deci-
sion of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and held that
the commercials presented one point of view upon a controversial public
issue and therefore called for application of the fairness doctrine. The
case was then remanded to the Commission for a determination of
whether the particular television station6 under attack had met its
'See text accompanying notes 19-37 infra.
-Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 369, 380 (1969): Obligations of Broadcast
Licensees Under the Fairness Doctrine, 23 F.C.C.2d 27 (1970): Editorializing Report, 13 F.C.C.
1246. 1251 (1949).
-449 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
'47 U.S.C. § 402(b) (1970) provides for the direct appeal of most decisions of the Federal
Communications Commission to the District of Columbia Circuit.
5Petitioners included Friends of the Earth, a national organization dedicated to environmental
protection, and its executive director. 449 F.2d at 1164.




In order to understand properly the significance of Friends of the
Earth, it is necessary to survey the development of federal regulation
of the communications media, the evolution of the fairness doctrine, and
the applicability of that doctrine to commercial advertising. Before 1927
radio stations were largely unregulated and could broadcast at any
frequency, power, or time desired. 7 The resulting chaos severely dimin-
ished the constructive value of the media.8 In response to this situation,
Congress enacted the Radio Act of 1927,1 which created the Federal
Radio Commission. Under the terms of the Act, the Commission was
empowered to allocate frequencies among applicants in a manner pro-
moting the "public convenience, interest, or necessity."' 0 Seven years
later Congress passed the Communications Act of 1934,"i which was
largely based on earlier legislation. The Act created the FCC and pro-
hibited broadcasting without a license issued by that agency. It also
established a comprehensive regulatory scheme which serves as the sta-
tutory basis for the Commission's activities today. As with the earlier
Radio Act, the FCC's standard for action was stated to be the "public
convenience, interest, or necessity." 12
While the Communications Act is otherwise silent on the issue, this
public-interest standard has provided the basis for the Commission's
regulation of radio and television program content. 13 Although this
power is limited to a degree by first amendment restrictions, 14 it has
The Radio Communications Act of 1912, ch. 287, 37 Stat. 302, which conferred upon the
Secretary of Commerce the power to regulate frequencies and broadcast hours, was almost totally
emasculated by judicial decision. Hoover v. Intercity Radio Co., 286 F. 1003 (D.D.C. 1923), cert.
dismissed. 266 U.S. 636 (1924). held that the Secretary had no discretion in granting licenses. Three
years later it was held that the Secretary also lacked the power to regulate frequencies, power, or
broadcast hours. United States v. Zenith Radio Corp. 12 F.2d 614 (N.D. III. 1926).
'By 1927 almost 200 radio stations were in operation and "with everybody on the air, nobody
could be heard." National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 212 (1943). See
Comment. Fairness Doctrine: Personal Attacks and Public Controversies, 56 GEO. L.J. 547, 547
n.1 (1968).
'Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162.
'Id. § 4.
"Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064, as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609
(1970).
"147 U.S.C. § 307 (a) (1970).
"See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 217 (1943); Retail Store
Employees Local 880 v. FCC, 436 F.2d 248, 256 (D.C. Cir. 1970). The FCC's regulation of
program content is exercised through its power to grant and renew broadcast licenses. See FCC,
PUBLIC SERVICE RESPONSIBILITIES OF BROADCAST LICENSEES 10 (1946).
"47 U.S.C. § 326 (1970) forbids censorship on the part of the FCC or interference with the
lirst amendment rights of licensees. However, in National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 3!9
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been recognized to exist almost since the inception of the federal regula-
tory scheme. 15 In National Broadcasting Co. v. United States' the Su-
preme Court directly confronted a contention that the Commission's
regulatory powers are statutorily limited to the technical aspects of the
communications media, such as frequency allocation and the prevention
of interference. In upholding the FCC's power to deal with program
content, the Court noted: "The Commission's licensing function cannot
be discharged . . . merely by finding that there are no technological
objections to the granting of a license."'' 7 In addition, the Court empha-
sized that "the [Communications] Act does not restrict the Commission
merely to supervision of the traffic. It puts upon the Commission the
burden of determining the composition of that traffic."'"
Almost as soon as control over program content was assumed, the
fairness doctrine was born. As early as 1929 the Federal Radio Commis-
sion stated that the "public interest requires ample play for the free and
fair competition of opposing views, and the Commission believes that
the principle applies . . . to all discussions of issues of importance to
the public."'" Thus, although not yet expressly labeled, the fairness
doctrine preceded the comprehensive regulatory scheme enacted by
Congress in 1934. With the restatement of the "public interest stan-
dard' 20 in the Communications Act, the fairness doctrine experienced
continuing development in the decisions of the FCC. In 1938 the Com-
mission expressly approved the doctrine in Young People's Association
for the Propagation of the Gospel2 The real strength of the fairness
U.S. 190. 226-27 (1943). the Court upheld the FCC's reasonable regulation or programming
content in the face of a first amendment attack. Since radio broadcasting was not available to all
because of the limited number of available frequencies, it was reasoned that those possessing a
license to broadcast must be subject to public regulation.
Notwithstanding the protection the first amendment affords television and radio licensees, it
has been construed to guarantee certain rights to the viewing public that are paramount to those
of broadcasters. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 396 U.S. 367, 386-90 (1969). This principle
was logically extended recently to strike down a licensee's flat refusal to broadcast paid announce-
ments of an issue-oriented nature. Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC. 450 F.2d
642 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. granted. 92 S. Ct. 1174 (1972) (No. 71-864).
"See. e.g.. FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134. 137-39 (1940).
16319 U.S. 190 (1943).
171d. at 216.
"Id. at 215-16.
"Great Lakes Broadcasting Co., 3 F.R.C. 32 (1929), rev'd on other grounds, 37 F.2d 993
(D.C. Cir.). petition for cert. dismissed, 281 U.S. 706 (1930).
'"See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
-'6 F.C.C. 178 (1938). Here the FCC denied an application for a station construction permit
because the applicant allowed only those with views similar to his own to use the facilities.
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principle was evidenced, however, in the 1941 Mayflower Broadcasting
Corp.2 ruling, which forbade licensees to editorialize or specifically
endorse political candidates. Such practices were felt to violate the poli-
cies formulated by the Communications Act. Naturally, this holding
was roundly criticized by licensed stations. Despite its earlier history, a
number of authorities officially date the fairness doctrine from the
Mayflower decision.?
The controversy precipitated by the holding in Mayflower resulted
in a modified statement of policy on the part of the Commission.
Editorializing By Broadcast Licensees,4 a report released in 1949, was
in fact the Commission's first definitive statement of the fairness doc-
trine. Noting that the doctrine was designed to foster "an informed
public opinion through the public dissemination of news and ideas con-
cerning the vital public issues of the day,"'25 the Commission approved
editorial broadcasting but expressly subjected it to the restrictions of the
fairness doctrine. This statement of policy currently stands as the Com-
mission's basic description of the fairness doctrine.
As set forth by the Commission's 1949 report and developed in
subsequent decisions, the fairness doctrine today actually imposes a dual
obligation on broadcast licensees. "The broadcaster must give adequate
coverage to public issues . . . and coverage must be fair in that it
accurately reflects the opposing views."2 If a sponsor cannot be found
to finance the presentation of this differing viewpoint, the broadcast
must be made at the licensee's expense. 7 Further, the programs advo-
cating such opinion must be prepared by the licensee on his own initia-
tive if unavailable from other sources. 28
In addition to the general provisions of the fairness doctrine, spe-
cific variations of that principle have developed to provide equal air time
for political candidates2 and to deal with personal attacks broadcast by
-8 F.C.C. 333 (1940).
z'See, e.g.. Robinson, The FCC and the First Amendment: Observations on 40 Years of
Radio and Television Regulation. 52 MINN. L. REv. 67 (1967).
2113 F.C.C. 1246 (1949).
VId. at 1249.
"
6Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 377 (1969). Business Executives' Move
for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. granted, 92 S. Ct. 1174 (1972)
(No. 71-864). reaffirmed the recognized duty on the part of licensees to discuss controversial issues
in holding that a station's fiat ban on paid public-issue announcements violated the first amend-
ment. See note 14 supra.
"Cullman Broadcasting Co., 40 F.C.C. 576 (1963).
"'Governor John J. Dempsey, 40 F.C.C. 445 (1950).
" Section 315 (a) of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1970), requires broadcasters
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licensed stations. a0 The constitutionality of the fairness doctrine and the
personal attack rules was most recently challenged in Red Lion Broad-
casting Co. v. FCC.31 Noting the broad powers available to the Com-
mission to assure protection of the public interest, the Supreme Court
upheld the FCC's rule-making power. It also interpreted the 1959
amendment of the Communications Act's provision affording equal
time to political candidates as embodying congressional acceptance and
adoption of the fairness doctrine.
32
While the fairness doctrine is thus sanctioned by Congress and the
Supreme Court, the actual details of its application and implementation
have never been delineated by the Federal Communications Commis-
sion. To a great extent, this has been left to the individual stations. As
recently stated by the Commission, "it is within the discretion of the
licensee, acting reasonably and in good faith, to choose the precise
means of achieving fairness. ' 33 Prior to implementation of the doc-
trine, a decision must be made as to its applicability. Application, in
turn, depends upon a finding that a controversial issue of public impor-
tance has been discussed by a station presentation. Although the Com-
mission has yet to set forth a test to determine whether a given issue is
"controversial," it has noted that such a finding is usually to be made
by the licensee, who is to use "reasonable judgment in good faith on the
facts in each situation. ' 34 Of course, this determination by the licensee
to "afford equal opportunities" to all legally qualified political candidates for a given office if a
single such candidate has been allowed to use the broadcaster's station. Specifically exempted from
the section's coverage are appearances by candidates in bona fide newscasts, interviews, documen-
taries, and on-the-spot coverage of news events. Id.
10Regulations promulgated by the FCC require that in the event of a personal attack upon
"an identified person or group," the station broadcasting such material must furnish the person
or group attacked a transcript of the presentation. Further, it must make available to that individ-
ual or group "a reasonable opportunity to respond over the licensee's facilities." Bona fide news-
casts, interviews, and on-the-spot coverage of news events are exempt from the regulation. 47
C.F.R. §§ 73.123, 73.300, 73.598, 73.679 (1971) (all identical).
-1395 U.S. 367 (1969).
Irlhe Court stated:
In 1959 the Congress amended the statutory requirement of § 315 that equal time be
accorded each political candidate to except certain appearances on news programs, but
added that this constituted no exception "from the obligation imposed upon [stations]
under this Act to operate in the public interest and to afford reasonable opportunity for
the discussion of conflicting views on issues of public importance." Act of September
14, 1959, § I, 73 Stat. 557, amending 47 U.S.C. § 315 (a) . ...
Id. at 380 (emphasis by the Court).
"Letter to Mid-Florida Television Corp., 40 F.C.C. 620, 621 (1964), quoted with approval
in Obligations of Broadcast Licensees Under the Fairness Doctrine, 23 F.C.C.2d 27, 28 (1970).
31FCC Public Notice: Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial
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is subject to review by the FCC. It has been held by the Commission
that determination of whether an issue is "controversial" is not bound
by the manner of its presentation,35 the degree of coverage by other
communications media, 3 or characterization of the issue as local
rather than national in nature.3
The FCC has long recognized that product advertising, even though
specialized programming in nature, can raise controversial public issues
and thus precipitate application of the fairness doctrine. As a 1946
Commission decision expressly notes, "[t]he fact that the occasion for
the controversy happens to be the advertising of a product cannot serve
to diminish the duty of the broadcaster to treat it as such an issue.' 38
Notwithstanding this recognition, the Commission has continuously
expressed an unwillingness to extend the fairness doctrine to individual
product commercials. Television Station WCBS-TV19 marked the
FCC's first actual decision so to apply the doctrine. This ruling held that
cigarette commercials presenting a favorable view of smoking raised a
controversial issue of public importance, voiced an opinion on the issue,
and thus created a situation calling for application of the fairness doc-
trine.
This decision was bitterly fought,4" but on appeal the Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed the Commission in Banzhaf v.
FCC.4 Although the court recognized that "public interest" was a
vague criterion for FCC action, it nonetheless concluded that "the pub-
Issues of Public Importance, 29 Fed. Reg. 10415, 10416, 40 F.C.C. 598, 599 (1964).
rSam Morris. II F.C.C. 197 (1946).
1WSOC Broadcasting Co.. 17 P & F Radio Reg. 548 (FCC 1968).
'rSee Note, Regulation of Program Content by the FCC. 77 HARv. L. REv. 701 (1964). The
FCC has determined a number of issues to be controversial, thus calling for application of the
fairness doctrine. These include civil rights, racial integration, the banning of nuclear testing,
medical advice, and pay television. FCC Public Notice: Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in
the Handling of Controversial Issues of Public Importance, 29 Fed. Reg. 10415, 40 F.C.C. 598
(1964).
13Sam Morris. I I F.C.C. 197, 199 (1946). Here the Commission held that a radio station
located in the temperance belt could not under the fairness doctrine advertise alcoholic beverages
without accepting anti-liquor material from temperance organizations. The Commission noted:
"(11t can at least be said that the advertising of alcoholic beverages . . .can raise substantial issues
of public importance." Id. See also Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners in Optometry, 374
U.S. 424. 437-41 (1963).
309 F.C.C.2d 921 (1967).
"Participants in the action included the American Tobacco Co., Liggett and Myers Tobacco
Co.. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., American Broadcasting Co., National Broadcasting Co., The
National Tuberculosis Association, and the Heart Disease Research Foundation. See Banzhaf v.
FCC. 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
"405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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lic interest indisputably includes the public health."4 In short, protec-
tion of the public health more than justified heightened governmental
involvement on the administrative level. Important to this result were
three unique characteristics attributed to cigarettes by the court: the
product threatens the health of a substantial part of the population, the
danger arises from the normal use of the product, and the danger is
statistically recognized by both governmental and independent research
groups.4 3
Banzhaf, besides accepting unprecedented FCC action, was unique
in another respect because it claimed to be self-limiting-the court
agreed with the Commission that it was not aware of a comparable
product warranting a similar ruling.4 Yet not three years later the same
circuit decided Friends of the Earth and based the decision primarily on
Banzhaf. Developments in the interim, largely changes in the Commis-
sion's thinking, greatly shaped this result.
Following Banzhaf, the Commission showed initial reluctance to
extend the cigarette decision's rationale to other situations. Thus in
WFMJ Broadcasting Co.4" it refused to hold the fairness doctrine appl-
icable to commercials advocating the patronage of a department store
that was the site of a strike and boycott. On appeal the D.C. Circuit
reversed," noting that a viewpoint set forth by an advertisement may
be implicit rather than explicit, and held it irrelevant in respect to the
fairness doctrine's application that the commercials in question failed
to mention the pending strike. The court directed the FCC to consider
more fully the charge that the commercials were primarily designed to
serve as a weapon in a labor-management dispute rather than as adver-
tising for standard purposes. The self-imposed restrictions of Banzhaf
were deemed without force in the face of a commercial presenting what
truly might be termed a controversial issue of public importance. 7
Despite this hint from the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit,
the Commission's reluctance to extend the doctrine persisted in its ini-
tial treatment of the Friends of the Earth complaint. However, while
this ruling was in the process of appeal, the FCC demonstrated growing
awareness of the implications in Banzhaf. In a National Broadcasting
321d. at 1096 (footnote omitted).
111d. at 1097.
111d. at 1097 n.63.
1514 F.C.C.2d 423 (1968).




Co. ruling (Chevron),48 it confronted the question of whether commer-
cials claiming that a particular gasoline substantially reduced air pollu-
tion, when faced with contentions to the contrary, required application
of the fairness doctrine. Although the FCC ruled that this was only a
claim of product efficiency and did not raise a controversial issue of
public importance, it did recognize the possibility that a product com-
mercial could, under somewhat closely defined circumstances, raise con-
troversial public issues. 9 Shortly after this first admission by the FCC
that application of the fairness doctrine could extend to product adver-
tising beyond cigarette commercials, another National Broadcasting
Co.n0 decision (Esso) was handed down. In Esso the Commission studied
commercials presented by an oil company advocating the development
and transportation of Alaskan oil. Finding the presence of a controver-
sial issue of public importance-the necessity of immediate develop-
ment of Alaskan oil preserves and the capability of oil companies to
pursue this development without environmental damage-the FCC di-
rected the licensee to satisfy its obligations under the fairness doctrine.
Both Chevron and Esso were utilized by the court in Friends of the
Earth, which marks the first judicial decision since Banzhaf to find
definitely that an advertisement advocating the purchase of a given
product raises a controversial public issue and merits application of the
fairness doctrine. Although this perhaps was not unexpected in light of
the new FCC thinking, it nonetheless stands as the first instance in
which a court in construing the fairness doctrine has judicially recog-
nized the controversial nature of an issue dealing with environmental
protection. Perhaps most important of all, the decision evidences re-
newed recognition that a controversial public issue may be implicit in a
product commercial and need not be explicit on the face thereof. Such
action can be interpreted as a preview of the fairness principle's increas-
ing utilization in the area of media advertising-notwithstanding adver-
tising's financial importance to broadcasting."
While in many respects Friends of the Earth clarifies what un-
doubtedly is an uncertain area of the law, it fails to provide specific
IgNational Broadcasting Co., 29 F.C.C.2d 807, 21 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 1097 (1971).
1129 F.C.C.2d at , 21 P & F RADIO REG. 2d at 1103 (1971).
"'National Broadcasting Co., 30 F.C.C.2d 643, 22 P & F RADIO Reg. 2d 407 (1971).
"'Even with the current limited application of the fairness doctrine to commercial advertising,
it appears that the doctrine has a weighty effect upon broadcasting revenue. One periodical recently
reported that "major television networks have rejected over a million dollars in advertising revenue
on no-fault insurance for fear of having the 'fairness doctrine' invoked. ... TRIAL, January-
February 1972. at 3.
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guidelines for the difficult task of identifying product commercials
raising "controversial issues of public importance" and thus requiring
resort to the fairness doctrine. Despite this shortcoming Friends of the
Earth, as supplemented by several recent developments," provides valu-
able assistance in formulating a rough test which can be utilized in
resolving the question of the doctrine's applicability. The test can be
stated as follows: Does a commercial explicitly or implicitly raise an
issue (1) regarding which there currently are clearly recognized and
contrasting substantiated viewpoints and (2) by which, or through the
condition with which it deals, a relatively large number of people either
on the national or local level are substantially affected?
In looking beyond the face of a commercial message and applying
the fairness doctrine as a result of issues that are raised implicitly, this
standard adopts the approach utilized in Friends of the Earth." It is
only through such a liberal construction that the fairness doctrine can
serve its ultimate purpose, that of exposing the public to all viewpoints
surrounding controversial issues. More narrowly to construe the doc-
trine would be to ignore the subtle means of communication available
to our media.
The two inquiries proposed by the test seek to guarantee that an
issue be both "controversial" and "public" in nature before demanding
consideration of the fairness principle. In requiring that there be "sub-
52During June, July, and August of 1971 no fewer than four decisions relevant to the fairness
doctrine and commercial advertising were handed down by federal appellate courts in addition to
Friends of the Earth. Green v. FCC, 447 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1971), and Neckritz v. FCC, 446
F.2d 501 (9th Cir. 1971), refused to hold the doctrine applicable to military recruitment advertise-
ments. In both cases appellants were unsuccessful in urging that such commercials raise the
admittedly controversial issues of the draft and the Vietnam War. Larus & Brother v. FCC. 447
F.2d 876 (4th Cir. 1971) affirmed an FCC ruling that certain anti-smoking messages did not raise
fairness-doctrine considerations because "it would be reasonable for a broadcaster to determine
that the health hazards of smoking no longer present a controversial issue." Id. at 878 (footnote
omitted). Finally, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in Business Executives' Move for
Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. granted, 92 S. Ct. 1174 (1972) (No.
71-864), overturned as violative of the first amendment a licensee's flat ban on commercial mes-
sages raising "controversial issues."
"This approach was also purportedly utilized by the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
in Green v. FCC, 447 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1971), in which the court dealt with a claim that military
recruitment advertisements raised controversial issues of public importance-namely the draft and
the Vietnam War-and therefore required application of the fairness doctrine. The court noted that
"the first issue, military manpower recruitment by voluntary means, is all that was implicit in
virtually all the Armed Services recruitment announcements" and that this does not constitute a
controversial issue. Id. at 329. The court, however, did find that as to both the draft and the
Vietnam War fairness doctrine standards had been satisfied as a result of the numerous viewpoints
broadcast on both issues. Id.
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stantiated viewpoints currently surrounding the issue," the standard
follows the reasoning of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Larus
& Brother v. FCC.-4 In that decision the court expressly refused to hold
the fairness doctrine applicable to certain anti-smoking messages for the
reason that the detrimental effects of cigarette smoking are now clearly
established beyond controversy. Such an application of the fairness doc-
trine avoids the required presentation of viewpoints totally lacking in
present credibility although once perhaps strongly advocated. The test's
second requirement, that the issue affect "a relatively large number of
people," is designed to justify application of the fairness doctrine with
its accompanying demands upon both licensees and the public.
In short, this analysis is designed to bring only those media com-
mercials raising truly significant public issues within the ambit of the
fairness doctrine. With this goal in mind, the proposed test is believed
to satisfy both the demands of the public interest and the practical
requirement that commercial advertising be sustained as a means of
providing revenue for the broadcast industry. Simultaneously, the test
recognizes the importance of bringing increased certainty to a crucially
significant area of the law.
LACY H. REAVES
Constitutional Law-Due Process and Compliance with Processing Re-
quirements for Welfare Applications
Judicial impetus to welfare reform has appeared recently as a po-
tent force in the effort to resolve the complex problems surrounding
welfare administration. The source of these problems is the conflict
between the need to reconcile idealistically conceived welfare programs
with the grass-roots practicalities of welfare administration.' In 1970 the
31447 F.2d 876 (4th Cir. 1971).
'The inability of the courts to establish workable guidelines in the area of welfare
administration may be attributed to the fact that the protections of procedural due
process have only recently been extended to welfare proceedings. The delay in instituting
these safeguards into the framework of the welfare system can be traced to the attitude
that welfare is synonymous with charity and to the ever present controversy over the
"right-privilege" dichotomy.
Recent Developments, Constitutional Law-Public Assistance-Due Process Clause Requires an
Evidentiar' Hearing to Precede the Termination of Benefits to Welfare Recipients, 16 VILL. L.
REv. 587, 589-90 (1971).
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Supreme Court assumed a vital position in the resolution of this prob-
lem by holding in Goldberg v. Kelly' that procedural due process re-
quires that an evidentiary hearing be held before public-assistance pay-
ments to welfare recipients may be discontinued. In the recent case of
Like v. Carter3 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals extended the due
process analysis of Kelly to situations in which state welfare officials
administering federal public-assistance funds4 failed to act upon public-
assistance applications within the statutorily required time period of
thirty days.5
The court in Like held that such a delay was a denial of the
applicants' due process rights and paid little heed to the large volume
of welfare applications and the insufficient number of competent
workers in the Missouri Welfare Department.6 Rather, the Eighth Cir-
cuit noted that the delay in applications was not a result of any fault of
the applicants and that the Missouri Welfare Department could have
greatly minimized the delays.7 The court indicated that the state excep-
2397 U.S. 254 (1970).
3448 F.2d 798 (8th Cir. 1971). Jurisdiction in Like was based upon 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343(3)-(4)
(1970). This issue in itself is an intriguing one but one with which the Eighth Circuit had little
difficulty. The court relied on Johnson v. Harder, 438 F.2d 7 (1971), for the proposition "that
where colorable constitutional (equal protection and due process) claims have been raised, jurisdic-
tion will lie." 448 F.2d at 801. Similarly, the court rejected defendants' assertions that jurisdiction
was lacking "by reason of plaintiffs' failure to exhaust available state administrative remedies."
Id. Nor were the defendants persuasive in their contention that jurisdiction was barred under the
eleventh amendment. Id. at 802.
'The State of Missouri cooperates in the following federal programs under the United States
Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1396 (1970): Old Age Assistance (OAA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-
306 (1970): Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-610 (1970). Aid
to the Blind (AB), 42 U.S.C. § 1201-1206 (1970): Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled
(APTD), 42 U.S.C. 1351-1355 (1970); and Aid to the Aged, Blind or Disabled (AABD), 42
U.S.C. 0 1381-1385 (1970). 448 F.2d at 800.
5The applicable federal provision is found in HEW, HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ASSISTANcE AD-
MINISTRATION, pt. IV, § 2200(b)(3) (1970), which provides:
A state plan for OAA, AFDC, AB, APTD must provide that:
(b)(3) prompt action will be taken on each application, within reasonable state-
established time standards (which, effective July 1, 1968, will not exceed 30 days in
AFDC, OAA, and AB ....
The pertinent Missouri provision is found in Missouri Division of Welfare Regulation No.
4.1 (1968):
For the OAA, ADC, and AB assistance applications (unless there are unusual or ex-
treme circumstances), prompt disposition means that there shall not be more than 30
days between date of application and (a) the date of approval if eligible; or (b) date of
rejection, if ineligible.
6448 F.2d at 803.
Uid. at 804.
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tion that excused compliance with the thirty-day requirement in the case
of unusual or extreme circumstances was inconsistent with the federal
statute and therefore contravened the supremacy clause." In awarding
the decision to the plaintiff-applicants, the court was satisfied
that the plaintiffs as a minimum are entitled to a declaratory judgment
determining that the applications. . . must be acted upon and the first
payment made to eligible applicants within thirty days . . . and that
eligible applicants whose claims have not been passed upon within
thirty days are entitled to have retroactive benefits. . . .
The focal points of this analysis will be the impact of this decision
upon state welfare administration and the applicability of the Kelly
balancing test of due process.
The due process implications of state-caused delay in the process-
ing of welfare applications were not unforeseen by the judiciary. Justice
Black, writing in dissent in Kelly, contended that
the inevitable result of such a constitutionally imposed burden[the
right to a pretermination hearing] will be that the government will not
put a claimant on the rolls initially until it has made an exhaustive
investigation to determine his eligibility. While this Court will perhaps
have insured that no needy person will be taken off the rolls without a
full "due process" proceeding, it will also have insured that many will
never get on the rolls, or at least that they will remain destitute during
the lengthy proceedings followed to determine initial eligibility.'0
The court in Like v. Carter, therefore, was readily able to anticipate the
due process problem and to apply appropriately the Kelly solution. Yet,
in its haste to find a denial of due process, the Eighth Circuit glossed
over the requisite balancing of governmental interests against the rights
of the individual welfare recipient and made only conclusory application
of the Kelly test of due process." That Kelly and Like both involved
'ld. at 803. An obvious prerequsite to invocation of the supremacy clause is that there be, in
fact, a federal law that will override the state law in question. That the supremacy clause applied
in Like was established by the judicial acknowledgement that the HEW HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC
ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION(1970) has the force and effect of law and therefore that the regula-
tions and exceptions promulgated therein must prevail over contrary state provisions. Id. at 803-
04.
'Id. at 805.
1397 U.S. at 279 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting); see also id. at 284-85 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
"For the application of this test in Kelly, see 397 U.S. at 261-66. Upon implementation of
the balancing test,
the Court prefers to look closely at the particular benefit at stake, weighing factors such
as the nature of government function involved, the extent of the possible injury, the
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rights under a state-administered public-assistance program did not
obviate the need for the Eighth Circuit to implement the Kelly balancing
test. It was essential to ascertain what in fact were the interests of both
government and welfare applicant and whether the applicant's interest
in receiving payments outweighed the government's interest in delay.
Such a balancing test is required in every instance of alleged denial of
due process as one must recognize from the fact that every violation of
a state welfare regulation does not automatically constitute an abridge-
ment of due process. 2 Nor is the scope of Kelly so broad that one may
equate without scrutiny the rights of welfare recipients who have real-
ized financial assistance with those of welfare applicants who have yet
to benefit from a public-assistance program. Therefore, the court in
Like should have considered the following factors: the nature of the
governmental function, the rationale for a particular procedure or regu-
lation, the extent of potential injury, and the available methods of ad-
hering to current procedures.' 3
The fundamental nature of the governmental function of financially
assisting the nation's impoverished was best described by Justice
Brennan in Kelly:
From its founding the Nation's basic commitment has been to foster
the dignity and well-being of all persons within its borders. We have
come to recognize that forces not within the control of the poor con-
tribute to their poverty. This perception, against the background of our
traditions, has significantly influenced the development of the contem-
porary public assistance system. Welfare, by meeting the basic de-
mands of subsistence, can help bring within the reach of the poor the
same opportunities that are available to others to participate meaning-
fully in the life of the community. At the same time, welfare guards
against the societal malaise that may flow from a widespread sense of
unjustified frustration and insecurity. Public assistance, then, is not
mere charity, but a means to "promote the general Welfare, and secure
the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.""
The tenor of the Constitution, if not its letter, thus appears to mandate
reason for the particular procedure, and the available alternatives before determining
the applicability of the due process clause.
The Supreme Court, 1969 Term. 84 HARV. L. REV. 32, 103 (1970).
'
2The dissent of Chief Justice Burger in Kelly illustrates this point by questioning whether a
welfare recipient must be accorded a hearing when his public assistance is merely reduced and not
completely terminated. 397 U.S. at 284-85.
"See note I I supra.
"397 U.S. at 264-65, quoting U.S. CONST. Preamble.
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the role that the government must play in public assistance. 15 However,
the absence of a specific constitutional obligation on the federal or state
governments to provide funds for welfare does not remove the right to
survive from that category of rights that are denominated "fundamen-
tal." 6
The thirty-day maximum limitation on the application processing
period is not an irrational guideline for the administration of welfare
funds. Rather, it is a necessary corollary to the governmental recogni-
tion of the individual's right to survive and of the prominent position
that government must assume in the protection of that right. 7 However,
the thirty-day requirement in itself was not the central issue in Like,1
since the state regulation conformed to the federal standard except for
a clause in the state provision that read "unless there are unusual or
extreme circumstances."' 9 On the basis of a broad interpretation of this
clause, the defendants in Like contended "that the large volume of
applications and the inability of the state welfare department to employ
a sufficient number of competent case workers excuses compliance with
the thirty-day requirement."20 The rationality of such an interpretation
is highly doubtful. To excuse delay where the applicant was not at fault
or where there was no uncontrollable administrative or emergency delay
(the recognized exceptions under the federal act2l) would nullify the
provisions of both the state and federal statute requiring reasonable
"SThe Court relied in Kelly upon the language of the preamble to the Constitution for positive
proof of some "fundamental" quality to the administration of public assistance. 397 U.S. at 265.
The courts have clearly established that there is no constitutional obligation on the states or the
federal government to furnish welfare funds. Westberry v. Fisher, 297 F. Supp. 1109, 1115 (D. Me.
1969): Smith v. King, 277 F. Supp. 31, 40 (M.D. Ala. 1967), affd on nonconstitutional grounds,
392 U.S. 309 (1968).
"E.g.. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954), established the essential and
fundamental nature of the right to primary and secondary education without any allusion to
constitutionally imposed obligations.
17448 F.2d at 803, 804.
1"Id. at 803.
"Missouri Division of Welfare Regulation No. 4.1 (1968).
"0448 F.2d at 803.
21HEW, HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC AsSISTANcE ADMINISTRATION, pt. IV, § 2300(b)(6) (1970)
provides:
Agency policies on standards of promptness for acting on applications are not used as
a basis for denying applications; they are exceeded in practice only in unusual situations
(e.g.. where the agency cannot reach a decision because of failure or delay on the part
of the applicant or an examining physician to provide needed information) and in a small
percentage of cases, and in such instances, the case record clearly shows that the delay
results either from circumstances within the claimant's control or from some administra-
tive or other emergency that could not reasonably be controlled by the agency.
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promptness in application processing.22
The potential for injury caused by processing delay is strikingly
apparent. The withholding of aid beyond the thirty-day period for deter-
mining the applicant's eligibility "may deprive an eligible recipient of
the very means by which to live while he waits. Since he lacks indepen-
dent resources, his situation becomes immediately desperate. ' 23 Fur-
thermore, the failure to alleviate promptly an applicant's need for subs-
istence commodities may engender indignation, frustration, and resent-
ment.24 These natural reactions to a government irresponsive to the
needs of the impoverished may deepen social alienation of large groups
of deprived citizens-an evil that is certainly more fatal to the social
fabric than the travail of a particular welfare petitioner whose applica-
tion has been unreasonably delayed in processing.
Finally, the reasonable methods of meeting the state and federal
mandate of thirty days must be considered. If there are none, then
perhaps the original requirement was ill-conceived and the proper rem-
edy is not to find a denial of due process but rather to revamp the
guidelines to welfare administration. The court in Like, however, did
conclude that several alternatives to prolonged delay in processing did
exist. Specifically noted was the possibility that "more aggressive and
effective action could be taken in the investigative procedure. ' 2 ' Further
cited was the excessive "twelve-day processing period after certification
elapses before the issuance of a check. ' 2 Also ill-received was the State
Welfare Department's assertion that a prolonged processing period was
required to screen out applications that were allowed on the basis of the
false representations of the applicant. The court indicated that the pro-
per remedies were the invocation of termination proceedings and the
implementation of criminal penalties rather than the wholesale delay in
processing of applications that were substantially non-fraudulent.27
The conclusion to be reached under the foregoing application of the
factors involved in the balancing test of Kelly is that due process was
indeed denied the welfare applicants in Like. The governmental function
involved was that of dispensing aid necessary for the subsistence of the
impoverished. The governmental duty of promptly administering such
1448 F.2d at 804.
7'Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970).
211d. at 265.





relief and the individual right to secure welfare benefits are organically
attached to that body of principles that control our society. The state
interpretation of acceptable exemptions from the explicit thirty-day pro-
cessing requirement was clearly illogical in view of the general policy
of prompt administration of welfare to those who require it. Further-
more, the potential damage that results from protracted periods of
processing is acute at both the individual and societal level. And finally,
the State Welfare Department did not pursue the available alternatives
to relieve the hardships incurred by excessive delays. The result of
weighing these factors is that the scales of due process come down
heavily on the side of the individual's interests and compel proper state
action to remedy the aggravated conditions present in Like.
The significance of Like v. Carter for welfare administration is
demonstrated in the Eighth Circuit's recognition of the demise of the
"right-privilege" dichotomy and the vitality of the "new property" con-
cept. 2 Like clearly represents the trend away from the "benevolent-
gratuity argument as a basis for insulating agency action from due
process requirements. 29 This traditional view precludes protection of
the due process clause when a privilege rather than a right is involved. 0
This concept has been substantially eroded by two distinct theories. One
theory suggests that despite the characterization of welfare as a privi-
lege, it must nonetheless be accorded due process protection." The
other theory, which has become the prevalent one, regards welfare as a
right.12 This latter theory rests on the premise that "[s]uch benefits are
a matter of statutory entitlement. . . . -3 Judicial recognition of this
premise is effectively an acceptance of Professor Reich's concept of
"new property," 3 which the Kelly Court acknowledged by noting that
"[i]t may be realistic today to regard welfare entitlements as more like
2'SWee Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J.
1245 (1965): Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law,
81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968).
-JRecent Developments, 16 VILL. L. REV., supra note 1, at 592.
aIThe traditional view was espoused in Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960), in which
the Supreme Court held that insurance benefits under the Social Security Act were not "accrued
property rights." Id. at 610. See also Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954); Hamilton
v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245 (1934).
"E.g.. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963);
Homer v. Richmond, 292 F.2d 719 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
a2E.g.. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Goliday v. Robinson, 305 F. Supp. 1224 (N.D.
III. 1969).
aGoldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970).
"
1Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
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'property' than a 'gratuity.' Much of the existing wealth in this country
takes the form of rights that do not fall within traditional common-law
concepts of property. ' 35 That the classical "right-privilege" dichotomy
is extinct and that the "entitlement" theory of Reich's "new property"
enjoys complete judicial acquiescence is conclusively established by the
Eighth Circuit's total unconcern in Like over the applicability of due
process protection to the traditional notion of "accrued property
rights. ' 3
The remedies fashioned by the Eighth Circuit in Like will have
significance not only for the aggrieved applicants but also for the entire
concept of state administration of welfare funds. Kelly and Like
establish that the state is no longer a distinct, separate governmental
entity that exercises its reasonable discretion in the administration of
federal public assistance. The two cases demonstrate that the imposition
of federal guidelines, through the power of the supremacy clause, upon
the state administration of welfare funding has resulted in the atrophy
of state discretionary powers in the area of public assistance. The state
has become a mere appendage of the federal government in the manage-
ment of welfare funds. Yet the alternative to state acquiescence in a
welfare program funded by the federal government is greatly diminished
revenue sources for public-assistance funding, which would be poten-
tially more devastating to a state than the mere curtailment of its discre-
tion. On the other hand, the question remains unresolved as to whether
a state government, having once accepted federal funds, has made an
irrevocable election to accept federal assistance in the future even if
faced with burdensome capital outlays to revamp the entire welfare
program in order to conform to federal provisions.
The judicial response to the foregoing question is problematical
although not altogether unpredictable. The courts appear to be con-
cerned with the practical effects that a controverted state action-such
as the rejection of federal welfare funds-might have on the well-being
of the individual.3 1 Indeed such an emphasis is but a manifestation of
the due process balancing test of Kelly, weighing governmental interests
against those of the ijdividual. The specific interests to be balanced are
the state's concern in maintaining a reasonable degree of discretion over
welfare administration and the individual's ability to survive on a sub-
1397 U.S. at 262 n.8.
:"Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 610 (1960).
:"E.g.. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224-25 (1971).
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stantially diminished allocation of total welfare funds. It is difficult to
envision that a federal court, having recognized the fundamental duty
of the government to "provide for the general welfare," would permit
the state concern over preservation of its dignity, identity, and discretion
to prevail over the individual's natural need to subsist where the state
has no source of necessary revenue other than federal funds. But perhaps
such a difficulty is not shared by all. Chief Justice Burger, dissenting in
Kelly, indicated his doubts over the broad applicability of the due pro-
cess concept as developed in that case:
Does the Court's holding embrace welfare reductions or denial of
increases as opposed to terminations, or decisions concerning initial
applications or requests for special assistance? The Court supplies no
distinguishable considerations and leaves these crucial questions unan-
swered. 8
The Court in Kelly did supply identifiable standards for resolving
this issue in the four factors that comprise the majority's due process
balancing test. One of the crucial questions alluded to by Chief Justice
Burger has now been answered by Like. The Court in Like applied the
Kelly balancing test, though not in a conspicuous fashion, and deter-
mined that the petitioning applicants were denied due process by state
noncompliance with the thirty-day requirement. In the wake of Like it
is neither illogical nor unforeseeable to predict that the courts' next step
may entail an application of the Kelly due process balancing test to the
situation in which the state has reduced welfare payments by voluntary
non-participation in federal programs. The outcome of such a case
would depend on too many variables-degree of reduction, potential
economic impact, and availability of alternatives-to hazard a general
prediction as to whether the individual's interests will prevail as they did
in Kelly and Like. Although the eventual position that the courts will
assume when faced with this situation is not altogether apparent, the
path that they will tread to reach that conclusion is clear. For the
standard of due process adopted in Kelly, and extended in Like, is not
a panacea for all the ills that beset welfare administration but a guide-
line to the priorities and interests that must be recognized if welfare is
ever to function in a manner responsive to the needs of those individuals
whose very existence depends on it.
MICHAEL CHARLES EBERHARDT
-397 U.S. at 284-85.
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Constitutional Law-Wyman v. James: The Fourth Amendment in The
Balance
Throughout American history the fourth amendment' has stood as
the basic safeguard of the privacy and security of individuals in our free
society against arbitrary invasions by agents of the national govern-
ment. Because this protection is implicit in the "concept of ordered
liberty, ' 2 its explicit terms were held applicable through the fourteenth
amendment to acts of state officials as well.3 The fourth amendment
has been applied in three distinct situations: (1) traditional criminal
cases,4 (2) civil forfeiture cases,5 and (3) criminal actions for refusal to
permit an administrative investigation.6 Recently, in Wyman v. James,7
the Supreme Court eschewed the opportunity to enlarge this third cate-
gory to include non-criminal state sanctions for an individual's refusal
to consent to administrative intrusions into his home.
In May, 1967, shortly before her son was born, Barbara James
applied for Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC),' and
after a caseworker visited her in her apartment, assistance was author-
ized. Two years later, upon being notified that a caseworker would again
visit her home, Mrs. James refused to permit the visit, offering instead
to meet elsewhere to give all pertinent information. She was warned that
her refusal would, under the New York welfare laws,9 result in termina-
tion of the assistance, but permission to visit was still denied. Assistance
was terminated after a Department of Social Services hearing, but Mrs.
James sought and received a temporary restraining order 0 and, later, a
'The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
3Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949). In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the
exclusionary rule was also held to be applicable to the states.
'E.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
5Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). Because of their quasi-criminal nature civil
forfeiture cases have been treated as criminal cases and, therefore, this category will not be
separately discussed.
'Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
7400 U.S. 309 (1971).
8AFDC is embodied in Social Security Act §§ 401-10,42 U.S.C. §§ 601-10 (1970); N.Y. Soc.
WELFARE LAW, § 343-62 (McKinney 1966) (now N.Y. Soc. SERVICEs LAW).
'N.Y. Soc. WELFARE Law § 134 (McKinney 1966) (now N.Y. Soc. SERVCas LAw).
1"James v. Goldberg, 302 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
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permanent injunction from a divided three-judge district court." On
appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the district court, holding that the
authorized home visit was not a search,' 12 and even if it were it would
not be unreasonable within the meaning of the fourth amendment. 3
This note will examine the Court's latter determination 4 after first
developing general fourth amendment theory, especially in the realm of
the administrative search.
For analytical purposes, the fourth amendment has frequently been
broken down into two clauses: the guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures and the requirement of a warrant based on proba-
ble cause. 5 The Supreme Court has debated for some years the relation-
ship between the clauses. One position is that the warrant clause states
an independent constitutional requirement that "law enforcement
agents must secure and use a search warrant whenever reasonably prac-
ticable"; 6 the other is that the existence of a search warrant is only one
factor among many to be considered in assessing whether the search in
question was reasonable. 17 In recent years the trend has been in the
direction of requiring a warrant, so that "searches conducted outside the
judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate are un-
reasonable per se under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.' 8 Searches have
been exempted from warrant requirements when they are (1) of vehi-
cles,'" (2) to prevent destruction of the evidence, such as taking a blood
sample from a man suspected of drunken driving,20 (3) in hot pursuit of
a suspected criminal,2' (4) incident to a lawful arrest, 22 (5) at interna-
"James v. Goldberg, 303 F. Supp. 935 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
2400 U.S. at 317.
'11d. at 318.
"This note will not discuss whether the authorized visit constituted a "search," id. at 317, and
whether the required termination of assistance for refusal to permit a home visit was an unconstitu-
tional condition, id. at 326-37 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The reader should note that the precise
holding of James is that the home visit does not constitute a "search", id. at 317-18, and therefore,
the point this note explores is technically dictum. Because it is felt that the major importance of
the case lies in its importation of the balancing technique into fourth amendment analysis, the scope
of this note is limited to that point.
"See note 1 supra.
"6Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 705 (1948). This case was overruled in United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1950).
"United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
"8Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
"Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
0Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 766-72 (1966).
2"Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967). But see Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30
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tional borders,"' and (6) of those suspected of criminal conduct for the
protection of the police officer ("stop and frisk" situations)."
In 1967 the Supreme Court, in Camara v. Municipal Court,2"
brought the area of administrative code enforcement inspections
involving criminal sanctions for refusal of permission to inspect under
the warrant requirement, but reduced the standard of probable cause to
something less than that required in a criminal case. The Court held that
area inspections were reasonable when the need to search outweighed
the invasion the search entailed, but whenever he owner of a particular
dwelling would not consent to the inspection, a warrant must be ob-
tained to enter the premises .2 The Court noted that "the warrant proce-
dure is designed to guarantee that a decision to search private property
is justified by a reasonable governmental interest, ' 27 by requiring a prior
determination of reasonableness rather than post hoc judicial review.
Although Camara would seem to control James, the Court distin-
guished Camara on the ground that Mrs. James had not been subjected
to criminal prosecution for denying the visit and, in fact, no criminal
prosecution was even authorized. 8 The James case presented four alter-
native resolutions for the Court: (1) that mere time and place notice
satisfied the'reasonableness test, (2) that closely regulated inspections
are reasonable, (3) that a warrant is required, but on a lesser standard
of probable cause, or (4) that a warrant obtained on a traditional show-
ing of probable cause is required. Of these, the Court chose the second
alternative and thereby created another exception to the warrant re-
quirement.
The reasoning behind this choice is significant because it is some-
what foreign to traditional fourth amendment analysis. By creating the
(1969); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
2Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969).
"Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54 (1925) (dictum).
"Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
-387 U.S. 523 (1967). Camara overruled Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959), which had
held, based bn the reasonableness clause, that so long as administrative investigations were statuto-
rily limited as to time and manner, they were not unreasonable. The Court in Frank had reasoned
that of the two interests it found protected by the fourth amendment-privacy and self-
protection-the latter was more intense, thus making the reach of the fourth amendment depend,
to a large extent on whether the search was part of a criminal investigation.
26In a companion case to. Camara, See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967), the Court
applied the same rationale to administrative searches of business premises.
"387 U.S. at 539.
1400 U.S. at 325. Mr. Justice Marshall, in dissent, argued that there should be no such
distinction. Id. at 340-41.
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new exception the Court, in its determination of the reasonableness of
the "visit" in James, eliminated both the need for a warrant and the
necessity of probable cause to search. This has been before only in the
border search29 and "stop and frisk"30 exceptions. Since the enactment
of the first border search statute in 1789,11 customs officers have been
authorized to carry out such searches on the mere suspicion that illegal
or dutiable goods are being concealed. The basis of this exemption is
threefold. First, this type of search historically has not been considered
to be controlled by the fourth amendment because the first border
search statute was enacted by the same Congress that proposed the Bill
of Rights.3 1 Secondly, the occasion for the search arises quickly.
Thirdly, there is a strong national interest in prevention of smuggling,
especially of narcotics.3 3 Terry v. Ohio34 eliminated the need for either
a warrant or probable cause in police "stop and frisk" encounters with
individuals who may be armed and dangerous on the ground that such
police conduct as a practical matter could not be subjected to the war-
rant procedure. In that situation the exclusionary rule is ineffective
because the police are not interested in prosecuting or are willing to
forego successful prosecution to achieve some other goal such as self-
protection.35 Welfare "visits," however, would not seem to qualify for
exception from warrant and probable cause requirements on any of the
above bases, and other reasons which can support such an exception are
insubstantial. The governmental interest in the administration of AFDC
is not as important as the national interest in stemming the international
narcotics traffic as in border searches; the occasion for the search does
not arise quickly as in border searches or "stop and frisk" situations;
and, unlike the "stop and frisk" situation, the warrant procedure would
be effective to prevent unjustified invasions of the homes of welfare
recipients because the caseworker has no "other goals" to further by an
unwarranted "visit." Thus the Court in James has made a significant
departure from past fourth amendment analysis.
The most important aspect of this departure is the Court's use of
"balancing of interests" to determine the reasonableness of the "visit."
2Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54 (1925) (dictum).
-Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
31Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 24, 1 Stat. 43 (1789).
3'Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886).
3Comment, Border Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 77 YALE L.J. 1007, 1011-12
(1968).
-392 U.S. 1 (1968).
"Id. at 14.
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Camara introduced balancing in the area of administrative inspections.
Though the warrant clause was clearly at issue there, the Court said that
the reasonableness of the inspection was to be determined by "balancing
he need to search against the invasion the search entails."3 Terry
adopted the Camara balancing test, holding that the governmental in-
terests in effective prevention and detection of crime and protection of
the officer in the street outweighed the brief, limited intrusion upon
individual rights, and therefore, the protective pat-down for weapons
was reasonable.' The Court in James cited Terry for the propositions
that reasonableness is the fourth amendment's standard and that its
specific content is to be determined by the particular context in which
it is asserted.38 The Court concluded that the governmental interests in
aiding dependent children, fulfilling the public trust, and administering
AFDC outweighed the limited intrusion upon Mrs. James' right of
privacy.39
The Court apparently borrowed its technique of balancing from a
line of first amendment cases. When the balancing test is applied in the
first amendment area it introduces substantial flexibility into interpreta-
tion of the amendment; the result of the balancing process depends on
what factors are fed into the "balance." For example, in Barenblatt v.
United States0 where a witness before a Congressional investigation
refused to answer questions concerning his political activities, the ma-
jority of the Court weighed broadly defined governmental inter-
ests-society's interest in preservation of the government and having
well informed lawmakers-against the narrowly defined individual in-
terest of the witness in refraining from revealing his political affiliations
and found the balance in favor of the government. Mr. Justice Black,
in his dissenting opinion, defined the individual interest more broadly,
as being the interest of society as a whole in being able to join organiza-
tions and advocate causes free from fear of governmental penalties, and
reached a conclusion opposite that of the majority of the Court.
In James, as in the first amendment cases, the balance came out
in favor of the state largely because the state interest was defined
broadly while the individual interest was defined narrowly. On the
11387 U.S. at 537.
11392 U.S. at 21-27.
'400 U.S. at 318.
311d. at 326.
40360 U.S. 109 (1959). See also Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961); In re Anastaplo,
366 U.S. 82 (1961).
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state's side of the balance was placed the alleged necessity of the home
visit as an administrative tool to assure the fulfillment of the public's
interest in aiding dependent children, to carry out the public trust, and
to know that its tax funds are properly expended." Against this the
Court weighed not the social interest in protecting homes from unwar-
ranted invasions of privacy, but Mrs. James' personal interest in the
privacy of her own home from the prearranged welfare visit.42
The Court's weighing of interests becomes even more questionable
upon a closer investigation of the alleged necessity of the home visit. No
statutory requirement for home visits exists. 3 The federal regulations
require only a periodic redetermination of eligibility,44 with field investi-
gations required only in a selected sample of cases.4 5 Even if one assumes
authority for the procedure, it is difficult to see what would be accom-
plished by a home visit. The child does not have to be present when the
caseworker visits,4 and, when a school-age child is involved, it is un-
likely that he would be present. There is no need to visit to see if there
is a man in the house since the presence of a "substitute father"-one
cohabiting with the mother, but owing no duty of support to the
child-has been held to be immaterial in establishing eligibility for
AFDC." Moreover, a congressional committee has found that the home
visit is ineffective as a means of veryfying eligibility," while it has been
reported that the incidence of ineligibility has not increased when the
affidavit system is used. 9 It should also be noted that the public interest
in aiding dependent children is undercut by termination of all AFDC
4'400 U.S. at 318-24.
411d. at 321-22.
111d. at 319 n.6; id. at 34547 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In other areas of social welfare law,
state regulations authorizing termination of AFDC benefits because of the mother's refusal to
cooperate have been struck down as impositions of additional conditions on eligibility not required
by the Social Security Act. See Weaver v. Doe, 92 S.Ct. 537, affg mem. Doe v. Swank, 332 F.
Supp. 61 (N.D. III. 1971). (mother required to name putative father and aid in obtaining child
support); Carleson v. Taylor, 92 S. Ct. 446, affg mem. Taylor v. Martin, 330 F. Supp. 85 (N.D.
Cal. 1971) (mother required to sign criminal non-support claim against absent father); Doe v.
Shapiro, 302 F. Supp. 761 (D. Conn. 1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 488 (1970) (mother
required to name father of illegitimate children).
11400 U.S. at 319, 342.
11400 U.S. at 319 n.6.
"Brief for Social Service Employees' Union Local 371 as Amicus Curiae at 4, Wyman v.
James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
"Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552 (1970); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1970).
"Brief for Social Service Employees' Union Local 371 as Amicus Curiae at 8-13, Wyman v.
James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
"Id. at 12.
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benefits to the child as the state did in James.
Ad hoc balancing as practiced in James enables the Court to make
any determination it wishes without regard for consistency and without
any assurance of impartiality.50 Thus the use of balancing in the James
category of cases, if applied to the fourth amendment generally, would
pose a serious threat to the substantive rules governing police conduct
that have evolved in the traditional criminal cases as protections of an
individual's privacy. If balancing is to be used in the fourth amendment
area, the Court should not follow the first amendment technique, but
should strive for a proper balance by only weighing interests of the same
level.51 A proper balancing of the interests in James would weigh only
particular interests in a specific situation: the state's need to go into the
home of a welfare recipient to verify eligibility when the recipient has
agreed to furnish all relevant information elsewhere against the particu-
lar individual's interest in not being bothered by the type of invasion of
hr privacy that a home visit would entail.
Even if proper balancing techniques are used, an individual's fourth
amendment right to privacy from governmental intrusion should not be
diluted through the balancing of competing interests. In an era of in-
creasing government paternalism, protection of an individual's privacy
can only be assured through the traditional warrant procedure.12 This
is especially true in personalized welfare administration as opposed to
impersonal area inspections for the enforcement of municipal codes.
The restrictions of the traditional probable cause standard in area hous-
ing inspections are not present in a case such as James where the case-
worker makes a visit to a specific home. Moreover, because one purpose
of a home visit is to guard against violations of the welfare code and
child abuse, both of which are felonies, no less than full probable
cause to search should be tolerated. One must consider the ease with
OSee M. SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH 161-62 (1966); Frantz, The First Amendment in the
Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424, 1440.48 (1962).
StM. SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH 83-84 (1966). Balancing of interests seems to be derived
from Roscoe Pound's theories of social engineering which reasoned that all public or social inter-
ests are actually individual interests viewed from different perspectives for purposes of clarity.
Therefore, if the system is to work, balances must be struck only by weighing carefully labelled
claims of the same level (i.e. social interests v. social interests, not social interests v. individual
interests). Id.
52See LaFave, Administrative Searches and the Fourth Amendment: The Camara and See
Cases, 1967 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 37, for a discussion of the inadequacies of the area probable cause
warrant procedure.
53400 U.S. at 339 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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which the warrant procedure could be carried out. If the recipient re-
fuses to consent upon notice of an upcoming visit, application for a
warrant could be made. If the caseworker could articulate facts that
suggested that violations or child abuse had been committed the warrant
would issue. If not, the home visit would not be necessary. In short, the
decision should be for an impartial magistrate, not for the caseworker
in the field.
GEORGE R. HODGES
Contracts-Partial Enforcement of Restrictive Covenantst
A restrictive covenant in an employment contract which unduly
restricts the covenantor will be closely scrutinized by the courts because
it violates the public policy against restraint of trade. According to the
traditional view as stated in the Restatement of Contracts,' if the cove-
nant can be construed to be reasonable it will stand but if not2 it falls;
to do otherwise would be to rewrite the contract for the parties. In
Ehlers v. Iowa Warehouse Co.3 the Supreme Court of Iowa has over-
ruled prior cases based on the Restatement rule and joined the growing
minority of states which have adopted the "partial-enforcement" doc-
trine long advocated by Professors Williston4 and Corbin..
The plaintiff in Ehlers, a former employee of the defendant truck
rental company, sought a declaratory judgment that two restrictive cov-
enants in his employment contract with the defendant were unreasona-
bly broad. The company counterclaimed for an injunction against viola-
tThe following closely related materials have appeared in this Review: Note, Covenants Not
To Compete, 38 N.C.L. REV. 395 (1960); Note, Restraints on Trade-Covenants in Employment
Contracts not to Compete within the Entire United States, 49 N.C.L. REv. 393 (1971); 26 N.C.L.
REv. 402 (1948).
'Where a promise in reasonable restraint of trade in a bargain has added to it a
promise in unreasonable restraint, the former promise is enforceable unless the entire
agreement is part of a plan to obtain a monopoly; but if full performance of a promise
indivisible in terms, would involve unreasonable restraint, the promise is illegal and not
enforceable even for so much of the performance as would be a reasonable restraint.
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 518 (1932) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
'See RESTATEMENT § 515.
3  Iowa - , 188 N.W.2d 368 (1971).
'S. WILLISTON & G. THOMPSON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1660 (rev. ed.
1937) [hereinafter cited as WILLISTON].
16A A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1390 (1962) [hereinafter cited as CORBIN].
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tion of the covenants. The first covenant at issue prohibited the plaintiff
from disclosing his list of the company's customers to third parties or
from using it in a competitive truck rental business after the termination
of his employment. There was no time limit as to the duration of the
restriction. The second restrictive covenant prohibited the plaintiff from
engaging in a competitive business within a 150-mile radius of Water-
loo, Iowa, for a period of two years.
In the course of the plaintiff's employment he had made contacts
on behalf of the company in many-but not all-of the towns around
Waterloo. The plaintiff was the company's principal representative, and
in some instances he was the company's only contact with the custom-
ers. While still employed by the company and without its knowledge,
the plaintiff, in direct violation of both restrictive covenants in his con-
tract, secured verbal commitments from twenty-five per cent of the
company's customers to do business with him after the termination of
his employment.
The defendant showed the need to enforce the covenants to some
extent since the plaintiff, while employed by the company, had gained
access to and influence over the customers.' Secondly, the truck rental
business in the area was highly competitive, and therefore there was no
danger of violating the public policy against monopolies by enforcing
the covenants. 7 A permanent restriction would have been unreasonable,
but rather than completely rejecting the first covenant the court applied
a two-year limitation. Since a period of two years was mentioned in the
second covenant the court had evidence of what the defendant felt was
reasonably necessary to protect itself. By partially enforcing the cove-
nants the Supreme Court of Iowa reversed its former position which was
in line with the so-called majority rule.' Since the court applied the
"partial enforcement" doctrine,9 it implicitly decided that the first cove-
nant would have been held reasonable and thus enforceable had it origi-
nally contained a two-year restriction.
The second covenant was also held to be overly broad. The court's
concern was to protect the defendant from an unfair advantage, but it
determined that to enforce the 150-mile geographic limitation would
have been unfair to the plaintiff. The geographic limitation was consid-
'The burden is on the employer to show this need if the covenant is to be enforced at all.
Iowa at -, 188 N.W.2d at 373.
71d.
'The majority rule is expressed in Brecher v. Brown, 235 Iowa 627, 17 N.W.2d 377 (1945).
Iowa at -, 188 N.W.2d at 370.
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ered to be unreasonable since it was not necessary to protect the defen-
dant in cities where the plaintiff had not done business during his em-
ployment. Rather than reject the entire covenant the court enforced
what it found to be a reasonable restriction: the court enjoined the
plaintiff from doing business with those persons or firms which he had
contacted while in the defendant's employ-but left the plaintiff free to
contact those firms, regardless of their location, with which he had had
no business dealings while he represented the defendant.
Restrictive covenants in employment contracts are closely scruti-
nized by the courts because the law frowns on contracts in restraint of
trade;' " in fact the oldest English cases voided all such covenants." The
classical notion was that a man cannot barter away his life and free-
dom, 2 but the modern cases have recognized that some restrictions are
necessary to protect the parties. Restrictive covenants are now generally
enforced if the court finds the restraint reasonably necessary to protect
a legitimate interest of the covenantee in view of its effect on the coven-
antor and the public interest. 3 For example, where A promises B that
he will not work in Chicago but B does business only in New York, the
promise is unreasonable because it does not protect a legitimate interest
of B.'4 Moreover, the legitimate interest of the covenantee must be
weighed against the possible detriment to the covenantor. 5 One who
sells a window-cleaning business does not by working as a janitor with
some window-washing duties violate a covenant against competition,
since to enforce the promise would deprive the seller of his right to work
while enforcing only a questionable interest of the covenantee. 6 In addi-
tion, agreements not to compete are contrary to the public interest
unless they are ancillary to another agreement such as an employment
contract or the sale of a business. 7 Even when construed to be reasona-
"OBlake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REv. 625, 646-51 (1960).
"E.g., Dyer's Case, Y.B. Mich. 2 Hen. 5, f. 5, pl. 26 (1414). See also 5 WILLISTON § 1634.
125 WILLISTON § 1652. See RESTATEMENT § 591; Pechon v. National Corp. Serv., Inc., 234
La. 397, 100 So. 2d 213 (1958) (employment contract for life held no morethan employment at
will).
135 WILLISTON § 1636; RESTATEMENT §§ 515-16.
"45 WILLISTON § 1636, at 4581; see Carpenter & Hughes v. DeJoseph, 217 Misc. 2d 1003, 213
N.Y.S.2d 856 (Sup. Ct. 1960), modified and aff d. 13 App. Div. 2d 611, 213 N.Y.S.2d 860 (1961)
where a city-wide covenant not to compete with a former employer was held unenforceable, but
the employee was forbidden to solicit his former employer's patients.
13......_ Iowa at -, 188 N.W.2d at 373-74; 5 WILLISTON § 1636, at 4581.
"Mitchell v. National Window Cleaning Co., 155 Ga. 215, 116 S.E. 532 (1923).
"Purchasing Associates, Inc. v. Weitz, 13 N.Y.2d 267, 273, 196 N.E.2d 245, 248, 246
N.Y.S.2d 600, 604-05 (1963); Wetzel, Employment Contracts and Noncompetition Agreements,
1969 U. ILL. L.F. 61.
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ble these agreements are strictly interpreted, and courts are inclined to
find that an act does not violate a restrictive covenant.' In the United
States the courts are less likely to enforce restrictive covenants in em-
ployment contracts than those in sales contracts because the former are
more likely to injure the promisor and the public. 9
An unreasonable covenant does not necessarily invalidate the entire
contract.20 There are three theories as to the extent of enforceability of
unreasonable covenants. The "all or nothing at all" view, the strictest
of the three, holds that an unreasonable covenant fails completely. For
example, where a covenant prohibited an employee from engaging in
similar work for five years either in the city in which she worked or in
any other city in which the company did business or intended to do
business the court found the restriction to be unreasonable and the entire
covenant failed.2' The geographic limitation was simply too broad to be
enforced by the court.
According to another theory, the covenant fails unless the offensive
term is severable from the rest of the covenant.22 If the restrictions are
separate and distinct so that if the unreasonable term is removed a
gramatically meaningful covenant is left, then the court will enforce the
reasonable term while voiding the "blue-pencilled" term. The Supreme
Court of North Carolina has adopted the "blue-pencil" test. In a case
in which the promise was not to compete in Fayetteville, any other town
in North Carolina, or any other town in the United States where the
company was doing business or intended to do business, the lower
court's application of the "all or nothing at all" rule was reversed. The
North Carolina Supreme Court held that while the nation-wide restric-
tions were clearly unreasonable and unenforceable the city-wide and
state-wide restrictions were severable, and the lower court was ordered
to make a separate determination of their enforceability.23 On the other
hand, an employee's promise not to engage in a business anywhere in
the state except in one city was held indivisible according to the lan-
guage used by the parties since there were no county or city boundaries
along which the covenant could be divided. Therefore the blue-pencil
"Purchasing Associates, Inc. v. Weitz, 13 N.Y.2d 267, 272, 196 N.E.2d 245, 247-48, 246
N.Y.S.2d 600, 604 (1963); 5 WILLISTON § 1636, at 4583.
1 Iowa at _ 188 N.W.2d at 375; 5 WILLISTON § 1643.
2'Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 U.S. 516, 521 (1959); 5 WILLISTON § 1659.21Welcome Wagon, Inc. v. Morris, 224 F.2d 693 (4th Cir. 1955).
22This is the majority view. Brecher v. Brown, 235 Iowa 627, 17 N.W.2d at 370.
2Welcome Wagon Int'l, Inc. v. Pender, 255 N.C. 244, 120 S.E.2d 739 (1961).
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test was not met and the entire covenant was held void. 21 Similarly, an
agreement not to engage in any business whatsoever would be indivisible
and totally invalid.?'
An increasing number of states as well as leading scholars have
rejected the all-or-nothing and blue-pencil tests in favor of the "partial-
enforcement" doctrine."6 This doctrine was expressed by the Ehlers
court as follows: "[U]nless the facts and circumstances indicate bad
faith on the part of the employer we will enforce noncompetitive cove-
nants to the extent they are reasonably necessary to protect his legiti-
mate interests without imposing undue hardship on the employee when
the public interest is not adversely affected '2 7 without regard to the
divisibility of the covenant.
The extent of the relief that will be granted depends upon the
relative equities in each case. In one case a promise by an employee not
to compete with his employer's laundry business for ten years was held
to be unreasonable, but the court enforced a restraint against soliciting
customers for a period of nine months as being reasonable based on
fairness and justice.21 Similarly, where a defendant had managed the
plaintiff's lumberyard under an employment contract containing a cove-
nant not to work for another lumberyard within fifteen miles for ten
years after the termination of employment and the defendant opened a
competing business in the same town, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
decided that a three-year limitation would probably be sufficient to
protect the plaintiff's interests. 29 The courts that follow the older theo-
ries refuse to look beyond the terms which the parties themselves have
written, while under the partial-enforcement doctrine the courts feel free
to modify the agreement and enforce instead a restriction that is reason-
able.
The proponents of the older theories believe that the partial-
enforcement doctrine ignores certain fundamental contract principles.
It has been argued that there is a basic presumption against agreements
in restraint of trade and that when a restrictive term is unreasonable it
is because a party has grasped for too much. Therefore, according to
2 Consumers' Oil Co. v. Nunnemaker, 142 Ind. 560, 41 N.E. 1048 (1895); 5 WILLISTON
§ 1659, at 4680-81.
25 WILLISTON § 1659, at 4681.
"Id. § 1660; 6A CORBIN § 1390. The major cases are listed in Ehlers. - Iowa at -. , 188
N.W.2d at 370.
2.. Iowa at __, 188 N.W.2d at 370.
2Schmidl v. Central Laundry & Supply Co., Inc., 13 N.Y.S.2d 817 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
"Fullerton Lumber Co. v. Torborg, 270 Wis. 133, 70 N.W.2d 585 (1955)
1972]
NORTH CAROLINA LA W REVIEW
this view, it is better to eliminate the restriction altogether." According
to the blue-pencil test the covenant reflects the intent of the contracting
parties, and the court's modification of an indivisible covenant is, in
effect, the imposition of what the court feels is "right" for the parties.
The court virtually rewrites the contract.' The partial-enforcement
doctrine dilutes these basic contract principles and allows the employer
to overreach, secure in the knowledge that the covenant will be enforced
to some extent.3 This knowledge impairs the ideal situation because it
destroys the bargaining power of the employee; that is, the employer will
know that he runs no risk and therefore will insist upon the harshest
terms. 33 The older views insist that when the court is allowed to rewrite
the contract the result will depend on subjective considerations that can
only lead to vagueness and uncertainty as to the respective duties of the
parties. According to Ehlers a court must find what is reasonably
necessary to protect the employer's legitimate interests without undue
hardship to the employee and without adversely affecting the public
interest.34 A test under which these factors are weighed is so vague and
open-ended as to be likely to result in a manifestation of the court's
values and not the parties' intention.
On the other hand, advocates of the partial-enforcement doctrine
have argued that its application leads to more equitable results without
disregarding the intentions of the parties. The blue-pencil rule has been
attacked as legalistic, mechanical, and leading to contradictory re-
sults.3 5 The legality of contracts ought not depend solely on form.
Under the blue-pencil rule it is argued that two contracts could have the
same meaning but only one would be enforceable because the writing
happened to be susceptible to deletion of the offensive terms while leav-
ing a grammatically meaningful promise.36
One authority has noted that most unreasonable covenants, al-
though illegal and unenforceable, are not the product of moral turpi-
tude; rather they result usually from a desire, however overly zealous,
to protect a party's own interests. Therefore there is no reason to punish
the party by throwing out the entire covenant and affording him no
"'See - Iowa at -, 188 N.W.2d at 376 (Becker, J., dissenting).
31 d. (interpretation should not involve rewriting contract); see Hamilton v. Wosepka. 261
Iowa 299, 312-13, 154 N.W.2d 164, 168 (1967).
L... Iowa at __, 188 N.W.2d at 376-77; 5 WILLISTON § 1660, at 4685.
3.. Iowa at -, 188 N.W.2d at 376.
3L...._ Iowa at -, 188 N.W.2d at 370.
.. _Iowa at , 188 N.W.2d at 371; 6A CORBIN § 1390, at 67.




The advocates of the all-or-nothing doctrine argue that the partial-
enforcement doctrine ignores the intent of the parties, but this argument
has two sides. The courts should not destroy a freely bargained contract
any more than is necessary to satisfy the various public policies.38 The
partial-enforcement doctrine gives effect to the parties' intentions to the
extent that the law would allow. It is further argued that the public
interest is best served and the sanctity of the contract is best preserved
by reducing the restriction to an enforceable level. The dividing line
between the unreasonable covenant and the enforceable covenant is
easily ascertainable.39 Even under the all-or-nothing doctrine the courts
must decide that the restriction is too severe to be reasonable." Under
the partial-enforcement doctrine the standard of reasonableness is en-
forced rather than just used as the standard of enforceability.
The partial-enforcement doctrine does not totally disregard the
intentions of the parties. When a party accepts a restraint, for instance,
over an unenforceably large area it is obviously reasonable to treat him
as having accepted a lesser and reasonable geographical restriction.4 '
Arguably, then, the application of the partial-enforcement doctrine does
not involve rewriting the contract in contravention of the intention of
the parties.12 In Ehlers, for example, by applying the two-year limitation
already contained in the second covenant to the first covenant, which
otherwise was unreasonable because it was of indefinite duration, the
court enforced a standard that the parties had implicitly agreed upon.
A similar result was reached when the court enforced the geographical
restriction only as to a class of customers and not as to all customers
within the 150-mile radius.
The inflexible all-or-nothing and blue-pencil theories allow parties
to escape their contractual responsibilities.4 3 When an overly broad
covenant falls entirely the covenantee is left without any protection,
while the covenantor is permitted to retain the entire contract considera-
:Corbin, A Comment on Beit v. Belt, 23 CONN. B.J. 43, 47 (1949).
" Williston, A Note on Belt v. Beit, 23 CONN. B.J. 40, 42 (1949).
" Corbin, supra note 37, at 47.
"The concept of reasonableness must be an underlying value in any such determination. When
a court decides that a covenant is reasonable it also decides that it is not unreasonable. Similarly,
when the court decides that a covenant is unreasonable, it can easily go one step further and decide
what is reasonable.
4
'Solari Industries, Inc. v. Malady, 55 N.J. 571, 582, 264 A.2d 53, 59 (1970).
"Corbin, supra note 37, at 50.
"Id. at 47.
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tion unless separate consideration was exacted for the covenant. He
would then be free to open a business next-door to his former em-
ployer.44
A final argument in favor of the partial-enforcement doctrine is
that it does not involve rewriting the contract any more than does the
majority blue-pencil rule. 5 Under each theory the contract is modified
by the court to make it enforceable. The blue-pencil theory involves a
mere mechanical excission of the offending term, while the partial-
enforcement doctrine goes one step further and assures that the rewrit-
ing by the court leads to the most equitable results under the circum-
stances.
The conflicting views will certainly collide when the American Law
Institute reconsiders the blue-pencil rule set out in section 518 of the
Restatement of Contracts. If the ALI adopts the partial-enforcement
rule, as it likely will, another issue that must be resolved is whether that
rule should apply only to employment contracts and not to contracts of
sale. The Ehlers court endorsed such a limitation, but the present section
518 makes no such distinction.
An employment contract is likely to be a contract of adhesion with
the parties in positions of unequal bargaining power."6 In the sales situa-
tion the parties are more likely to have bargained for each term. Some
have argued that for this very reason the all-or-nothing doctrine should
be applied to contracts of employment to prevent the employer from
overreaching with the expectation of at least partial enforcemeni.14 This
argument is countered by the requirement of the partial-enforcement
doctrine that the covenant be made in good faith if it is to be enforced
at all.48 Since the concept of reasonableness is equally ascertainable in
the sales and employment situations, there would seem to be no need
for a distinction if the premises of the partial-enforcement doctrine are
sound. The partial-enforcement doctrine requires an examination by the
court of the surrounding circumstances so that whatever considerations
are peculiar to either the sales or the employment situation will be
considered when deciding what is reasonable and enforceable in each
case.
49
44Id. at 50; see Beit v. Beit, 135 Conn. 195, 63 A.2d 161 (1948); 6A CORBIN § 1390, at 76.
16A CORBIN § 1390, at 68-69.
111d. § 1394, at 89.
4.__ Iowa at -, 188 N.W.2d at 376-77 (Becker, J., dissenting); 5 WILLISTON § 1660, at
4685.
"'See - Iowa at _, 188 N.W.2d at 370.
"In the sales situation the UNIFOPNI COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302(i) allows an unconscionable
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If adopted the partial-enforcement doctrine will support the equi-
ties of each situation rather than mechanically apply legalistic rules of
interpretation. As stated in Ehlers, the result will be that the legitimate
interests of the covenantee will be protected without undue hardship to
the covenantor when the public interest is not adversely affected. 0 This
balancing of conflicting interests will enable the courts to dispense jus-
tice rather than act as legal technicians.
DAVID M. RAPP
Sales-Strict Liability For Breach of Warranty: Gore v. George J. Ball,
Inc.
As a general rule two parties may deal with each other as they wish,
and if their ensuing agreement is voluntarily and fairly entered into, it
will be enforceable in a court of law. However, this fundamental right
of freedom of contract is subject to the limitation, inter alia, that the
agreement may not be against public policy. The vague and somewhat
amorphous concept of public policy has been applied by courts to invali-
date contracts which in the opinion of the court tend to be injurious to
the public welfare, to sound morality, or to the interests of society.' In
Gore v. George J. Ball, Inc.,2 the North Carolina Supreme Court re-
fused to enforce a limitation-of-damages clause in a contract between a
seed seller and a farmer because such a provision "is contrary to the
public policy of this State."'3
In 1965, using an order blank obtained from a George J. Ball, Inc.
catalogue, C. 0. Gore ordered four ounces of Heinz 1350 tomato seeds
at a cost of five dollars. Shortly thereafter Gore received from Ball
several packets of seed labeled "Heinz 1350 Tomato Seed." Included
contract or clause to be enforced according to any one of the three theories:
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have
been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the
contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable
clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any
unconscionable result.
OSee text accompanying note 27 supra.
'E.g., Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224 (1892); Perkins v. Hegg, 212 Minn. 377, 3
N.W.2d 671 (1942).
2279 N.C. 192, 182 S.E.2d 389 (1971).
31d. at 203, 182 S.E.2d at 395.
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on each package of seed, on the invoice delivered to Gore, and in the
seed catalogue was a clause purporting to limit Ball's liability for any
breach of warranty to the return of the buyer's purchase price. Gore
planted the tomato seeds, but when they germinated they produced not
Heinz 1350 tomatoes but a completely different variety "wholly un-
suited for sale for table use and useful only in the production of tomato
paste."4 After refusing to accept a refund of his five-dollar purchase
price, Gore filed suit against Ball alleging breaches of an express war-
ranty of description and of the implied warranty of fitness and seeking
to recover consequential damages, including lost profits.5
Justice Lake, writing for the North Carolina Supreme Court, found
that the defendant seed seller had warranted the seed contained in the
packets to be "Heinz 1350 tomato seed" and that delivery of a different
variety of seed by defendant constituted a breach of its contract.' The
court made no specific finding as to whether the limitation-of-damages
clause was incorporated into the contract but stated that even if it were
a part of the contract, it would not be enforceable because it was con-
trary to the public policy of North Carolina.
The Gore court noted that an agreement is against public policy
when it "tend[s] to the violation of a statute."7 In support of this propo-
sition the court cited Cauble v. Trexler,8 a case in which the North
Carolina Supreme Court refused to allow a foreclosure of a second
mortgage on farmland because the mortgage was violative of the pur-
pose of the Emergency Farm Mortgage Act of 1933.1 In that case a
federal land bank agreed to lend to a mortgagor-farm owner 2,600
dollars on the condition that the mortgagee would agree to accept this
amount as a full satisfaction of the farmer's debt. The mortgagee agreed
in writing to scale down the amount owed, but after receiving the money
he coerced the owner of the farm into giving him a second mortgage on
the balance of the debt. The North Carolina Supreme Court noted that
'Id. at 195, 182 S.E.2d at 390.
-The court noted that plaintiff's complaint was not a "model of clarity and precision as to
the theory upon which he relied." 279 N.C. at 198, 182 S.E.2d at 392. Plaintiff appears to have
alleged that defendant expressly warranted the seeds to be a specific kind and variety. In addition
plaintiff alleged the breach of an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. Both these
warranties must have arisen under the common law of North Carolina, if at all, because the
Uniform Commercial Code had not been enacted in North Carolina at the time of the transaction
in issue.
1279 N.C. at 200, 182 S.E.2d at 393.
VId. at 203, 182 S.E.2d at 395.
227 N.C. 307, 42 S.E.2d 77 (1947).
'Act of May 12, 1933, ch. 25, § 32, 48 Stat. 31.
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the primary object of the federal statute was to relieve farmers from
their load of oppressive debts, and thus any agreement in contravention
of the statute was void as against public policy.' 0 In another North
Carolina case, Courtney v. Parker," the court refused to allow recovery
by a building materials company on a contract because the company
was transacting business under an assumed name in direct violation of
a statute. The court stated:
It is well established that no recovery can be had on a contract
forbidden by the positive law of the state, and the principle prevails as
a general rule whether it is forbidden in express terms or by implication
arising from the fact that the transaction in question has been made
an indictable offense or subjected to the imposition of a penalty. 2
In Gore the court held that the limitation-of-damages clause was
contrary to the purpose of the North Carolina Seed Law. 3 This act
makes it unlawful
to sell, offer for sale or expose for sale within this State. . . vegetable
seeds...
c. Not labeled in accordance with the provisions of this article or
having a false or misleading labeling or claim.
j. To which there is affixed names or terms that create a misleading
impression as to the . . . kind and variety, .... quality or origin of
the seeds.'4
The violation of any provision of the act is a misdemeanor punishable
by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars. 5 According to the court,
this statute was intended to protect farmers against the disastrous conse-
quences of the sale and delivery to them of falsely labeled seed. 6 Thus,
the underlying policy of the statute would forbid enforcement of a
limitation-of-damages clause in a seed sales contract.
The court in Gore could have grounded its refusal to enforce the
objectionable clause on alternative legal theories. It might have said as
the South Carolina Supreme Court did in Stevenson v. B. B. Kirkland
10227 N.C. at 311, 42 S.E.2d at 80-81.
"173 N.C. 479, 92 S.E. 324 (1917).
'ld. at 480, 92 S.E. at 324.
'
3N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-277 to -277.28 (1966), as amended, (Supp. 1971).
"Id. § 106-277.9(1) (1966).
15 d. § 106-277.24 (1966).
1279 N.C. at 204, 182 S.E.2d at 396.
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Seed Co. 17 that the limitation-of-damages clause was not a part of the
agreement between the two parties. In Stevenson, in an analogous fact
situation, the South Carolina court stated that "the nonwarranty clause
printed in appellant's catalogue, on its invoice sheets, and on cards
inserted in its seed bags is immaterial. For such a clause to be applicable
in any case, it must be shown that it was brought to the attention of
the purchaser."'' 8 The court in Gore refused to decide that as a matter
of law the clause did not become a part of the agreement, stating that
even if it were a part of the contract it would be invalid.
The Gore court also rejected the reasoning of a Washington case,
Nakanishi v. Foster,9 in which defendant had sold mislabeled lettuce
seed. The court in Nakanishi found that the seller had violated the
provisions of a state statute (similar to the North Carolina Seed Law)
that regulated the selling and labeling of seed. Since the Washington act
was penal in nature and was enacted for the protection of the farmer,
the court found that defendant's violation of the statute constituted
negligence per se.20 The Gore decision disagreed with this analysis and
held that defendant's violation of the seed act could not be negligence
per se because the North Carolina Seed Law was not a safety statute.2 1
The North Carolina court in Gore avoided the reasoning in
Stevenson and Nakanishi in order to hold specifically that a limitation-
of-damages clause included by a seed seller in a sales contract is against
public policy. The court's holding, however, is based on a questionable
interpretation of the North Carolina Seed Law. The act explicitly ex-
empts from liability any person who sells
vegetable seeds which were incorrectly labeled or represented as to
origin, kind or variety when such seeds cannot be identified by exami-
nation thereof unless such person has failed to obtain an invoice or
'176 S.C. 345, 180 S.E. 197 (1935).
"Id. at 355, 180 S.E. at 201.
164 Wash. 2d 647, 393 P.2d 635 (1964).
2Id. at 656, 393 P.2d at 641; accord, Hoskins v. Jackson Grain Co., 63 So. 2d 514, 515 (Fla.
1953) (en bane).
21279 N.C. at 198, 182 S.E.2d at 392. The North Carolina court on numerous occasions has
stated that violation of a safety statute constitutes negligence per se. However, the violation must
be the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. E.g., Bell v. Page, 271 N.C. 396, 156 S.E.2d 711
(1967); Reynolds v. Murph, 241 N.C. 60, 84 S.E.2d 273 (1954). A safety statute as defined by the
court is a law designed to protect the public from physical injury to person or property. See Byrd,
Proof of Negligence in North Carolina, 48 N.C.L. REv. 731, 746 (1970). The North Carolina Seed
Law, which the court itself says was designed to "protect farmers from ...disastrous consc-
quences," 279 N.C. at 204, 182 S.E.2d at 396, is not a safety statute apparently because its purpose
is only to protect an economic interest.
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grower's declaration giving origin, kind and variety or to take such
precautions as may be necessary to insure the identity to be that
stated."2
Ball's conduct fell within this exemption as the seed of the two varieties
of tomatoes were not distinguishable by physical inspection and Ball had
obtained from the grower an invoice showing the variety of the seed to
be Heinz 1350.23 The court admitted that defendant's activity was not
in violation of the statute. It stated, however, that the "provision ex-
empting the vendor, under the circumstances designated, from the pen-
alties imposed by the Act is not intended to absolve him from liability
to the purchaser for breach of contract.'2 4 This answer is unsatisfactory
because the question before the court was not whether defendant was
liable for his breach of contract, but whether he could successfully limit
his damages once the breach was established.25 The fact that the legisla-
ture exempted some activities from the penalties of the statute would
seem to imply that such conduct is not against the public policy of North
Carolina. In fact it is arguable that the legislature was explicitly provid-
ing a means by which seed retailers could comply with the provisions
of the statute and concomitantly protect themselves from liability.
Although Gore's conclusion that the limitation-of-damages clause
contravenes public policy is debatable, the court's analysis is significant
because it focuses attention on the inequitable nature of the contract.
Perhaps the court was suggesting that in the future such oppressive
terms will not be enforced in North Carolina. In essence, the Gore
opinion declares the limitation-of-damages clause to be unconscionable.
Such a result could be reached directly under the provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code, which had not been enacted in North Caro-
lina at the time of the transaction between Gore and Ball. 2 The court
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-277.10(e) (1966).
"Gore v. George J. Ball, Inc., 10 N.C. App. 310, 312, 178 S.E.2d 237, 239 (1971). The court
of appeals in its discussion of negligence per se bypassed the question of whether the North
Carolina Seed Law was a safety statute and instead predicated its holding on the fact that defen-
dant did not violate the seed law. Id. at 313, 178 S.E.2d at 240.
2279 N.C. at 205-06, 182 S.E.2d at 397.
'2But see Zicari v. Joseph Harris Co., 33 App. Div. 2d 17, _ 304 N.Y.S.2d 918, 924-25
(1969), in which a New York court similarly confused the separate issues of liability for breach of
warranty and ability to contractually limit damages.
2The Uniform Commercial Code was enacted into positive law in North Carolina by the 1965
legislature and became effective on July 1, 1967. Ch. 700, §§ 1-11, [1965] N.C. Sess. L. 768
(codified as N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-1-101 to -10-107 (1965), as amended, (Supp. 1971)). The
numbering of sections in the North Carolina Code corresponds to that used in the 1962 Official
Text of the Uniform Commercial Code, except that each number is preceded by the chapter
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in Gore, unable to rely on the statutory authority of the Code, had to
use the only tools it had available, and thus it declared the agreement
to be contrary to public policy.27
The Uniform Commercial Code allows a vendor and purchaser to
limit contractually the remedies available to the buyer for a breach of
warranty by the seller.2 The Code specifically states that the measure
of damages may be altered "by limiting the buyer's remedies to return
of the goods and repayment of the price." 9 This is precisely the Gore
situation. According to the Code, such a provision is binding on the
parties "unless the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable."3 Section
2-302 allows a court to find as a matter of law that the entire contract
or any clause in the contract is unconscionable .3 The Official Com-
ments to the Code note that section 2-302 was intended to allow a court
to pass directly on the unconscionability of a contract. "In the past such
number, "25." Thus, § 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code is § 25-2-302 of the North Caro-
lina Code. The Official Comments to the Code have never been enacted into positive law in North
Carolina. They are recorded in chapter 25 of the General Statutes, however, and presumably are
used by North Carolina courts in interpreting specific sections of the Code.
27The court was probably correct in its determination that it lacked the statutory authority to
directly invalidate a contract as unconscionable. At least one court, however, has held as a matter
of common law that an unconscionable contract is unenforceable. Williams v. Walker-Thomas
Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
Courts of equity have consistently refused to enforce unconscionable provisions in contracts.
See, e.g., Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948). Professor Pomeroy in his
treatise on equity jurisprudence states that
[t]he specific performance of a contract will be refused when . . . the contract itself is
unfair, one-sided, unconscionable, or affected by any other such inequitable feature, and
where the specific enforcement would be oppressive or harsh upon the defendant, or
would prevent the enjoyment of his own rights, or would in any manner work injustice.
4 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1405(a) (5th ed. 1941).
Z'UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316(4) [hereinafter cited as UCC].29UCC § 2-719(I)(a).
3
°UCC § 2-719(3). It may have been possible to invalidate the suspect clause in the Gore
contract without resorting to the unconscionability section of the Code. Section 2-719(2) imposes
a limitation of reasonableness on any damages which the parties have undertaken to regulate
consensually. This limitation applies "[w]here circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy
to fail of its essential purpose." UCC § 2-719(2). The Official Comment notes that the very essence
of a sales contract requires "that at least minimum adequate remedies be available." UCC § 2-
719, Comment 1. Arguably, the purchaser in Gore would be deprived of the entire benefit of his
bargain if the limitation-of-damages clause were enforced, and thus he would not have the mini-
mum adequate remedies which the Code requires. See also 1 W. HAWKLAND, A TRANSACTIONAL
GUIDE To THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 174-75 (1964).
31UCC § 2-302. This section was deleted when the Uniform Commercial Code was initially
enacted in North Carolina. However, the 1971 legislature incorporated the provision into the
statute and it became effective on October 1, 1971. Ch. 1055, § 1, [1971] N.C. Sess. L.- (codified
as N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-302 (Supp. 1971)).
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policing has been accomplished by adverse construction of language, by
manipulation of the rules of offer and acceptance or by determinations
that the clause is contrary to public policy or to the dominant purpose
of the contract. '32
The Code offers no explicit definition of unconscionability, but the
Official Comment states that the principle is one of "prevention of
oppression and unfair surprise. ' 33 Since these two abuses appear most
often in contracts between two parties with unequal bargaining power,
it may be helpful to analyze unconscionability in terms of disparate
bargaining power. An oppressive contract may be defined as one in
which a stronger party forces a weaker party to accept terms which are
both burdensome and unjustified by commercial necessities. The weaker
party accepts the oppressive terms, although aware of the consequences,
because his bargaining power is such that he must do business on those
terms or not at all. 34 In Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,35 a
case discussed in the Gore opinion, the New Jersey Supreme Court
refused to enforce this type of oppressive clause. In that case an automo-
bile owner sued the dealer and manufacturer to recover for personal
injuries and consequential damages to the auto incurred in an accident
caused by a defect in the car's steering mechanism. The defense was
based largely on a provision in the sales contract that limited the manu-
facturer's liability for breach of warranty to the replacement of defective
parts. The type of disclaimer in question was used not only by defen-
dant, Chrysler Corporation, but also by every other automobile manu-
facturer in the country.36 Thus, the automobile buyer lacked any mean-
ingful choice in the matter; he could either purchase a car and accept
the limitation clause or purchase no car at all. The Henningsen court
relied heavily on this factor in reaching its decision:
-UCC § 2-302, Comment I (emphasis added). See also Spanogle, Analyzing Unconsciona-
bility Problems, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 931 (1969), where the author states:
Unconscionable contracts and clauses have been surreptitiously invalidated for decades.
But surreptitious invalidation created problems. The courts did not usually invalidate
on the express ground that a particular clause or contract was unconscionable. Their
regard for "freedom of contract" prevented such a straightforward approach or any
explicit recognition of judicial control over the terms of a bargain. Instead, the courts
resorted to various formal, technical devices to achieve their ends.
Id. at 934 (footnote omitted).
"UCC § 2-302, Comment 1.
"See Comment, Bargaining Power and Unconscionability: A Suggested Approach to UCC
Section 2-302, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 998, 999 (1966).
-32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d.69 (1960).
'lId. at 390-91, 161 A.2d at 87.
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[The standardized mass contract] is used primarily by enterprises with
strong bargaining power and position. "The weaker party, in need of
the goods or services, is frequently not in a position to shop around
for better terms, either because the author of the standard contract has
a monopoly (natural or artificial) or because all competitors use the
same clauses. His contractual intention is but a subjection more or less
voluntary to terms dictated by the stronger party, terms whose conse-
quences are often understood in a vague way, if at all."37
In the seed-sale situation a buyer also has no meaningful choice. Appar-
ently all seed growers and retailers rely on the same or similar
limitation-of-damages provisions in their sales contracts." Thus, the
farmer in Gore was in a worse position than the auto buyer in
Henningsen because he could not afford the luxury of forgoing his
purchase. Economic realities dictated that he buy the seeds on whatever
terms they were available. The court noted that a breach of warranty
for an automobile part would not automatically cause harm to the
consumer, but the mislabeling of seed would unavoidably cause injury
to a farmer.39 "Loss of the intended crop is inevitable; the extent of the
disaster is measured only by the size of the farmer's planting."'"
The second element of unconscionability, unfair surprise, is per-
haps best demonstrated by the fine print contract that contains a
labyrinth of words and expressions defining the rights and obligations
of each party. In most situations the non-drafting party either fails to
read the fine print or is unable to comprehend the technical legal lan-
guage. In Henningsen the limitation-of-damages clause appeared on the
back of a sales contract and the buyer's attention was directed to it by
the smallest, least legible print in the entire document.4 The court con-
cluded that even if the consumer had read the clause, he would not
3Id. at 389, 161 A.2d at 86.
11279 N.C. at 202, 182 S.E.2d at 395.
Z1Id. at 208, 182 S.E.2d at 398. Of course it is possible that a better crop would result because
of the inadvertent supplying of a superior strain of seed which responds well to similar cultivation
methods.
The Gore court also failed to consider the fact that Henningsen dealt primarily with personal
injury. Traditionally, personal injury has been thought to be a much greater wrong than mere
economic injury. This distinction is evidenced by the fact that § 2-719(3) of the Code makes
limitation-of-damages for a personal injury prima facie unconscionable, but such a contractual
provision for commercial losses is allowed unless proved unconscionable.
10279 N.C. at 208, 182 S.E.2d at 398.
"132 N.J. at 365, 161 A.2d at 73. The Henningsen court caustically remarked that "[t]he
draftsmanship is reflective of the care and skill of the Automobile Manufacturers Association in
undertaking to avoid warranty obligations without drawing too much attention to its effort in that
regards." Id. at 400, 161 A.2d at 93.
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understand its legal ramifications. The Gore court questioned whether
a prospective seed purchaser would notice the suspect clause and under-
stand its legal implications. The opinion conceded that an experienced
lawyer would have understood the significance of the provision, but the
court felt that "most retail purchasers of seed are not experienced in the
art of discovering such phrases in the midst of language relating to other
matters. '42 While both Henningsen and Gore held the limitation-of-
damages clause to be against public policy, the citation of section 2-302
by the Henningsen court suggests that it felt the case presented the type
of abuses which that section of the Code was intended to prevent.4 3
A limitation-of-damages clause may be considered a means of allo-
cating unknown or undeterminable risks between two contracting par-
ties. Arguably, in a Gore-type situation the parties are merely allocating
this burden. The seed retailer sells his goods at a relatively low price
because he is not guaranteeing them. The farmer is willing to accept
virtually any risk in order to avoid having to pay a higher price for the
seeds. Some courts have been persuaded by this logic and have conse-
quently upheld limitation-of-damages clauses in seed-sale cases." For
example, in Hoover v. Utah Nursery Co. 5 the court reasoned that
[t]he purchase price of a parcel of seed is usually insignificant as
compared with the value of the crop that may be raised therefrom. For
this small price the seed merchant may feel that he cannot afford to
warrant. Crops are destroyed or impaired by many causes, [some of
which are] hard to identify. The law, considering these larger facts and
circumstances, gives validity to these disclaimers .... 46
In Gore the North Carolina Supreme Court did not mention these
considerations, perhaps recognizing that there was no mutually under-
stood, bargained-for allocation of the risk. Any pre-litigation thought
as to who should bear the burden apparently was engaged in only by
the retailer, who had drafted the provision. The buyer probably never
even considered the question. The Gore court, by invalidating the
limitation-of-damages clause, may have been making a policy decision
that as between the two parties the seed retailer was better able to
absorb the cost of accepting the risks.
11279 N.C. at 202, 182 S.E.2d at 395.
1132 N.J. at 404, 161 A.2d at 95.
"E.g., Asgrow Seed Co. v. Gulick, 420 S.W.2d 438 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967); Hoover v. Utah
Nursery Co., 79 Utah 12, 7 P.2d 270 (1932).
179 Utah 12, 7 P.2d 270 (1932).
'Id. at 17, 7 P.2d at 273.
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Two other courts recently presented with cases quite similar to
Gore ruled that the limitation-of-damages clause was against public
policy.47 These decisions did not go nearly as far as Gore, however,
because in each case the defendant was found to have been culpable in
some degree. In one instance the seed grower was actually negligent,48
and in the other, he fraudulently misrepresented the kind and quality
of the seeds.49 In contrast, the defendant in Gore was free of fault. The
result of the court's decision in Gore is that seed growers and retailers
are strictly liable for selling mislabeled products in North Carolina.
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, now in force in this state, the
seller by labeling his seeds to be a specific variety has given an express
warranty of description 0 that may not be disclaimed by any inconsistent
terms in the sales contract.51 While the Code permits contractual limita-
tion of damages, the Gore opinion would forbid such a modification, at
least if the damages were limited to the return of purchase price. Thus,
under the Code, a seed seller may not disclaim his liability for breach
of an express warranty and under Gore he may not limit his damages.
ERNEST S. DELANEY, III
Securities Regulation-A Little Light and More Obfuscation on Rule
10b-5
For a decade or more there has been a prolific development of
federal case law involving private actions based on violations of section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934' and of the implementing
41Klein v. Asgrow Seed Co., 246 Cal. App. 2d 87, 54 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1966); Dessert Seed Co.
v. Drew Farmers Supply, Inc., 248 Ark. 858, 454 S.W.2d 307 (1970). In Dessert Seed the court
stated that the limitation-of-damages clause was "unreasonable, unconscionable, and against sound
public policy." Id. at 865, 454 S.W.2d at 311 (emphasis added).48Dessert Seed Co. v. Drew Farmers Supply, Inc., 248 Ark. 858, 865, 454 S.W.2d 307, 311
(1970).
"'Klein v. Asgrow Seed Co., 246 Cal. App. 2d 87, -, 54 Cal. Rptr. 609, 618 (1966).
-UCC § 2-313(i)(b).
51See UCC § 2-316(1); UCC § 316, Comment 1; UCC § 2-313, Comments 1, 4.
'15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970). The portion of the statute relevant to this discussion reads as
follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means




Rule l0b-5.2 The result has been a broadly based federal anti-fraud law
which is tending to replace state remedies of common law fraud in
securities transactions.' As this new body of law developed, the United
States Supreme Court remained relatively silent on section 10(b) and
Rule 1Ob-5.4 This silence has been broken with Superintendent of Insur-
ance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.5 Unfortunately, the nature of the
facts alleged in the complaint in Bankers Life and the questions of law
presented are outside the ambit of common corporate experience. Thus,
those who had hoped for much illumination of Rule 10b-5 when the
Court chose to review a case will probably be more disappointed than
enlightened.
Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 directly affect the activities of most
corporations and their directors, officers, and controlling shareholders.
Decisions must be made on a recurrent basis with respect to transactions
in securities and in particular with respect to disclosure of information
on corporate activities. The holdings of the lower federal courts have
left varying degrees of uncertainty in the law governing such decisions.
What is the extent of the duty to disclose material information? What
information is material? Who is liable to be treated as an insider and
thus be required to surrender trading profits?6 And, finally, how are
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manip-
ulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations
as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or
for the protection of investors.
217 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1971):
It shall be unlawful...
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to [make a misleading
omission] . . . or
(c) to engage in any act, practice or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
3For sympathetic discussions of this trend see Bloomenthal, From Birnbaum to Schoenbaum:
The Exchange Act and Self-Aggrandizement, 15 N.Y.L.F. 332 (1969); Ruder, Current Develop-
ments in the Federal Law of Corporate Fiduciary Relations-Standing to Sue under Rule lOb-5,
26 Bus. LAW. 1289 (1971).
'Rule lob-5 was construed in SEC v. National Sec. Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1968), but in the
Court's own language "[tihe questions presented [were] narrow ones." Id. at 465. The case was
not a private action, and the more significant question resolved was that the IvcCarran-Ferguson
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1970), reserves to the states the regulation of insurance companies with
respect to their relations with policyholders but does not preempt federal regulation where securi-
ties transactions are concerned.
192 S. Ct. 165 (1971).
'The leading case which posed these questions and which is responsible for the proliferation
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remedies to be determined?7 Cases that pose these questions are not
infrequent, and the answers to these questions are of much concern to
corporate managers. Fortunately, it is the rare corporate manager who
must decide-like the defendants in Bankers Life-whether he will be
vulnerable under federal law if he siphons five million dollars of assets
from an insurance company. It is, then, an unhappy accident that the
principal case deals with such an unusual fact situation rather than the
recurrent problems exemplified by the classic case of SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co.'
In Bankers Life, the Superintendent of Insurance as plaintiff stood
in a role analogous to that of a trustee in bankruptcy of the defrauded
and insolvent Manhattan Casualty Company.' The complaint alleged
that certain of the defendants devised and executed a scheme whereby
they bought all of the common stock of Manhattan through the use of
its own assets to meet the purchase price. As a result, the company's
assets were depleted by five million dollars, it was apparently rendered
insolvent thereby, and creditors and policyholders were allegedly left
vulnerable.10 The fact that the complaint was evidently unclear and
incomplete" together with the circumstance that the case arose on a
motion to dismiss makes for some unfortunate speculation on the facts.
Despite this, it is at least relatively clear that there were three distinct
sets of transactions which made up the composite fraudulent scheme.,'
First, one of the individual defendants purchased all of the common
stock of Manhattan from Bankers Life and Casualty Co. with a five-
of Rule l0b-5 cases is SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1969). In that case officers, directors, and management personnel of the company
who had knowledge of a significant mineral discovery were held to have violated Rule lOb-5 by
trading in the securities of the company in advance of public disclosure. In addition, the company
itself was found to have committed a violation by releasing an equivocal news item underplaying
the discovery.
7See Weiskopf, Remedies under Rule IOb-5, 45 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 733 (1971).
'401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
'Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 300 F. Supp. 1083, 1086 n.l (S.D.N.Y.
1969).
1There is an issue of fact as to whether any person was indeed damaged by the defendants'
acts. The Supreme Court opinion alludes to damage to creditors. 92 S. Ct. at 169. The Securities
Exchange Commission speaks of damage to policyholders and creditors. Brief for SEC as Amicus
Curiae at 27. Contrariwise, the defendant Irving Trust Co. points out that the policyholders were
reinsured and that the Superintendent of Insurance is not asserting any creditor claims. Brief for
Respondent Irving Trust Co. at 23.
"300 F. Supp. at 1086 n.2. The confusion centers on two issues: was anyone actually damaged?
See note 10 supra. And was the board of directors in fact misled? See text accompanying note 25
infra.
12300 F. Supp. at 1087-92 provides a comprehensive treatment of the facts.
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million-dollar check drawn on the Irving Trust Co., there being no funds
on deposit with Irving to cover this check. Second, the new owner
caused the sale of Manhattan's portfolio of United States Treasury
obligations to cover this check. Third, there ensued an elaborate "shell
game" of purchasing and pledging certificates of deposit for the purpose
of showing Manhattan as payee for five million dollars to replace the
sold Treasury notes. In fact, the certificates were assigned to another
company controlled by the individual defendants and had no asset value
to Manhattan despite their appearance on the Manhattan balance sheet.
The district court characterized the case as one of common law
fraud under state law.13 The court of appeals affirmed. 4 The Supreme
Court, reversed, holding that a cause of action was stated under Rule
I Ob-5.15
The first and most obvious rule that can be extracted from Bankers
Life is that a private cause of action may be maintained on the basis of
a violation of Rule lOb-5.16 This conclusion is certainly anti-climactic
in that it was clearly foretold by the holding of the Supreme Court in
J. L Case Co. v. Borak17 (wherein a private cause of action was upheld
for violation of other sections of the Securities Exchange Act) and had
already formed the basis of decisions in substantially all of the courts
of appeals.'
It is also clear from Bankers Life that the Court will place a liberal
interpretation on the requirement that the Rule be confined to an "act
.. .in connection with the purchase or sale of any security."' 9 There
were three separate transactions in Bankers Life. The first was the sale
of the common stock of Manhattan by the defendant Bankers Life to
the defendant Begole. There were two obstacles to finding a violation
of section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 solely on the basis of this transaction.
First, there was no allegation that the sale was for less than the full value
"Id. at 1102. In addition to a cause of action under state common law, it would appear that
the Superintendent of Insurance could attack the transaction by statute. See N.Y. INs. LAW § 536
(McKinney 1966).
"Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 430 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1970).
"92 S. Ct. at 169-70.
WId. at 169 n.9.
17377 U.S. 426 (1964). Earlier still, the apparent progenitor of private action cases under Rule
lOb-5 was Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
"For a tally of cases and jurisdictions see 6 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 3871-73 (Supp.
1969) (hereinafter cited as Loss).
"See the text of Rule lOb-5 in note 2 supra. There had been little prior judicial interpretation
of the significance of the "in connection with" phrase. There is a limited discussion in 6 Loss 3616-
17.
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of the stock. Second, Manhattan was not a party to the sale of its own
stock. To have allowed the plaintiff standing on the basis of this initial
transaction would have meant repudiation of the so-called "Birnbaum
rule"20 that the plaintiff must be either a buyer or a seller to bring the
action. As for the second transaction, Manhattan was a party to the sale
of its portfolio of Treasury bonds but it was not alleged that Manhattan
received less than full consideration for the bonds .2 There was no fraud
in connection with the sale of the bonds viewed as an independent trans-
action.
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the actual fraud occurred
in the third transaction-when the certificate of deposit payable to
Manhattan was assigned without consideration and thus became value-
less as an asset of Manhattan. The fraud was consummated when the
proceeds of the prior transaction were thus diverted. Certificates of
deposit, however, are presumably not "securities" within the definition
of Rule lOb-5.2 2 Hence, the Rule would not have reached the fraudulent
act if the Court had interpreted "in connection with" as limited to the
immediate transaction which constituted the fraud. It was necessary to
treat the three separate transactions as one for the purpose of finding
an "act . . .in connection with the . . . sale of any security."
The second principle to be derived from Bankers Life would there-
fore seem to be that there is a violation of Rule 1Ob-5 such as to support
a cause of action when there is a sale of securities for full consideration,
followed by a fraudulent diversion of the proceeds, if the successive
transactions are planned and executed contemporaneously as part of
one integral fraudulent scheme. Such a broad interpretation of the "in
connection with" requirement presents two problems. From a policy
2'Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
It is possible that Bankers Life will be regarded by some as diluting the Birnbaum rule, but it should
be noted that the Court was careful to avoid doing so by interpreting the transaction so as to find
that the plaintiff was a "seller." The only allusion to the rule is in an ambiguous footnote. 92 S.
Ct. at 169 n.10.
2 The Treasury bonds were treated as within the definition of "securities" in 15
U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1970). Cf. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967) (savings and loan
shares included).
zlThe district court declined to rule specifically on the question of whether certificates of
deposit are "securities" under Rule lOb-5, but the inference in the opinion is that they are not.
300 F. Supp. at 1099 & n.14a. In the definition of securities in the Securities Act of 1933, 15
U.S.C. § 77b(l) (1970), an "evidence of indebtedness" was covered and would presumably include
certificates of deposit. The 1934 Act, however, excludes the phrase "evidence of indebtedness" and
further expressly excludes "any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance which has a
maturity . . . not exceeding nine months." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1970). In the principal case,
the certificates had a six month maturity. 300 F. Supp. at 1100.
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perspective, it reinforces a trend toward a general federal common law
governing corporate fraud based on Rule 1Ob-5. It also poses the practi-
cal problem of how closely related the individual transactions need be
to fit into the Bankers Life pattern. Would the Court have found a cause
of action if the diversion of the proceeds had followed the sale of the
notes by one day? By one week? By one month? The opinion leaves these
questions unanswered.
Another question that had not been clarified by prior case law
under Rule 1Ob-5 was whether it was necessary that at least some of the
directors or shareholders of the corporation be deceived by the alleged
act or practice. Unfortunately, confusion of the facts in Bankers Life
deprives us of a clear answer to this question. This confusion centers on
the authorization of the sale of Manhattan's Treasury bonds. The Su-
preme Court seems to have assumed that the defendants induced the
directors of Manhattan to authorize the sale and in so doing misrepre-
sented or concealed the plan for diversion of the proceeds.2 3 The district
court assumed with much practical logic that the defendants installed
themselves or others who were presumably privy to the scheme as offi-
cers and directors immediately upon their acquisition of the Manhattan
common stock.2 4 The brief for the defendant Irving Trust Company so
states.25 If the latter view is correct, there was no deception or misrepre-
sentation. It is unlikely, however, that the outcome of the case would
have differed whatever view is closer to the facts. The Court had deter-
mined that the interests of the creditors and policyholders were to be
protected, and it was not likely to be deterred by the distinction as to
whether any of the directors had been deceived." It is thus probable that
an action may be brought by the "defrauded" corporation for the pur-
pose of protecting creditors even when the directors, the officers, and
the shareholder(s) of the corporation are the perpetrators of the fraud
or are privy to it. It is also apparent that it is not necessary that investors
be damaged by the deceptive act or practice. Thus, a third general rule
192 S. Ct. at 167 n.l.
21300 F. Supp. at 1089 n.6.
z'Brief for Respondent Irving Trust Co. at 5, Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas.
Co., 92 S. Ct. 165 (1971).
2GThis conclusion is not totally clear from the principal case because of the apparent assump-
tion that some or all of the directors were deceived. Some case law supports the conclusion. See
Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1970); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969); Ruckle v. Roto American Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir.
1964) (dictum); ef. A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967). But see O'Neill v.
Maytag, 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964).
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may be drawn from the principal case: there is no longer any doubt that
the protection of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 extends beyond "the
integrity of the securities markets ' 2  to reach the corporate entity and
thereby its creditors.2
The Court in Bankers Life states that it finds support for this broad
view of the class of persons to be protected in the legislative history of
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act.2 1 Illustrative, perhaps, of
the dubious value of that legislative history is the fact that the court of
appeals reached the opposite conclusion, 3 while at least one eminent
authority finds the legislative history cursory and inconclusive.3'
There is a basic policy question as to the need for a general body
of federal law dealing with fraudulent breaches of the fiduciary duties
of directors, officers, and controlling shareholders of corporations.32 If
the answer is "yes," there is a second question as to whether such a body
of law should be judge-made rather than the product of legislative codi-
fication. 33 It is certainly true that those who would answer "yes" to
both of these questions will be cheered by the holding of Bankers Life.
Two divergent lines of case law had developed under the Rule lOb-
5 umbrella. The first involved securities fraud in the pattern typified by
Texas Gulf Sulphur. The second involved general corporate mismanage-
ment through breaches of fiduciary duties. Conspicuous examples of the
'Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 430 F.2d 355, 361 (2d Cir. 1970).
z'See Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365
U.S. 814 (1961); Macey, Protection of Creditor's Rights Through Use of Rule lOb-5, 76 CoI.
L.J. 133 (1971); c.f. A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967).
292 S. Ct. at 169 & n.8.
1430 F.2d at 361. The court of appeals followed the general interpretation set out in the
Birnbaum case.
3'6 Loss 3617 approves the Birnbaum version of the legislative history. For an entertaining
firsthand commentary on the cursory treatment given to Rule 10b-5 at the time of its adoption by
the Securities Exchange Commission see remarks of M. Freeman in Proceedings of ABA Section
of Corporation. Banking and Business Law, Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities
Laws, 22 Bus. LAW. 793, 921-23 (1967). For an appraisal which concludes that no sort of civil
remedy can be supported by the legislative history see Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule lOb-5:
Judicial Revision of Legislative Intent? 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 627 (1963).
32See 6 Loss 3631-45, 3875. On the subject of the growth of Rule lOb-5, Professor Loss has
further said, "This is backdoor jurisprudence with a vengeance." Loss, History of SEC Legislative
Programs and Suggestions for a Code, 22 Bus. LAW. 795, 796 (1967). See, in addition, the articles
cited note 3 supra.
3See Proceedings of ABA Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law, Conference
on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. LAw. 793 (1967); Painter, Rule lOb-5:
The Recodification Thicket, 45 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 699 (1971); Comment, Federal Corporation
Law and lOb-5: The Case for Codification, 45 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 274 (1970).
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latter are Ruckle v. Roto American Corp.,4 where the defendant direc-
tors issued treasury stock to perpetuate their control; Schoenbaum v.
Firstbrook,35 in which a majority stockholder used its control to ac-
quire additional shares for inadequate consideration; and Hooper v.
Mountain States Securities Corp., 6 another instance of the issuance of
stock for inadequate consideration. Bankers Life can be seen as encour-
aging the use of Rule 1Ob-5 as it was used in these cases to allow
recovery for the breach of fiduciary obligations.
Nonetheless, Bankers Life is an atypical case and may be more
interesting for what it does not decide than for what it does. A valid
argument for a federal law governing corporate fraud is that the result
will be uniformity and simplified corporate decision-making. This argu-
ment for supplanting state law fails when the federal law develops
helter-skelter and lacks uniformity. A major role of the Supreme Court
is to help induce clarity and uniformity. Thus, if the Court decides to
encourage expansion of the role of the federal courts, it can be helpful
by accepting the concurrent responsibility of seeing that the expansion
is orderly and consistent. Bankers Life, dealing as it does with a peri-
pheral situation, may not prove to be very helpful in this respect.
In summary, Bankers Life foretells a broad interpretation of the
requirement in Rule lOb-5 that the questioned acts must be "in connec-
tion with" the purchase or sale of securities. The case also approves the
extension of the protection afforded by the Rule to creditors as well as
investors. On the other hand, the Court leaves the technical "Birnbaum
rule" undisturbed-the plaintiff must be a buyer or a seller.3 The
anomalous result is an endorsement of the letter of the Birnbaum case
but an implied rejection of the spirit of Birnbaum in that the basic
rationale for the Birnbaum rule was to confine the private cause of
action to the protection of the integrity of the securities markets.
As a result, Rule IOb-5 becomes a stronger weapon for the enforce-
ment of the general fiduciary duties of directors and controlling share-
holders, apart from its narrower function of regulating securities trans-
actions. Business lawyers and corporate managers, however, will have
to wait for definitive answers to the day-to-day questions of disclosure
obligations and remedies under Rule lOb-5.
ROBERT D. DARDEN, JR.
34339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964).
-1405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
-282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961).
"Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
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Torts-Proximate Cause in Strict-Liability Cases
A recent Indiana case, Galbreath v. Engineering Construction
Corp.,' represents a new approach to the problem of proximate cause
in tort cases involving strict liability. Defendant in this case used dyna-
mite to blast rock-an abnormally dangerous activity for which strict
liability is imposed under Indiana law.2 The explosion broke a high-
pressure gas pipe, and the escaping gas ignited when it came into contact
with a backhoe engine operating nearby. Plaintiff, who was repairing
the broken pipe, was severely burned. He sought to hold defendant
strictly liable for his injury, but the trial court sustained a demurrer to
his complaint3 on the ground that strict liability for blasting was limited
to damage caused by vibrations or flying debris.4 The Indiana Court of
Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that strict liability should ex-
tend to any harm that is a reasonably foreseeable result of an abnor-
mally dangerous activity.5
Strict liability has been gradually increasing in importance in tort
law during the past century. Traditionally it has been imposed when
damage is done by trespassing livestock' or by wild7 or vicious' animals.
Since the landmark case of Rylands v. Fletcher,9 many courts have also
imposed strict liability for harm resulting from "ultrahazardous"'' or
'_ Ind. App. -, 273 N.E.2d 121 (1971). Defendant's petition for transfer to the Indiana
Supreme Court was denied. Letters from Frank E. Tolbert, counsel for defendant, to the writer,
Jan. 24, 1972, and from J.T. Hillis, counsel for plaintiff, to the writer, Jan. 25, 1972.
2Enos Coal Mining Co. v. Schuchart, 243 Ind. 692, 188 N.E.2d 406 (1963).
3Plaintiff also alleged that defendant had conducted its blasting operations negligently. On
this allegation the case went to the jury, and the verdict was for defendant, but the court of appeals
held that there had been error in the judge's instructions to the jury. - Ind. App. at. - ,
273 N.E.2d at 129-31.
1d. at __, 273 N.E.2d at 122.
'Id. at , 273 N.E.2d at 124-29.
6E.g., Page v. Hollingsworth, 7 Ind. 317 (1855); Johnson v. Robinson, Il Mich. App. 707,
162 N.W.2d 161 (1968) (per curiam); see W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 76,
at 496-99 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER]. A few courts have rejected strict liability
for trespassing livestock. E.g., Saldi v. Brighton Stock Yard Co., 344 Mass. 89, 92, 181 N.E.2d
687, 690 (1962); Bethune v. Bridges, 228 N.C. 623, 46 S.E.2d 711 (1948).
7E.g., Collins v. Otto, 149 Colo. 489, 369 P.2d 564 (1962); Smith v. Jalbert, 351 Mass. 432,
221 N.E.2d 744 (1966); see PROSSER § 76, at 499-500. Again, a few courts have rejected strict
liability in this situation. E.g., Hansen v. Brogan, 145 Mont. 224, 400 P.2d 265 (1965).
'E.g., Zarek v. Fredericks, 138 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1943); Hill v. Moseley, 220 N.C. 485, 17
S.E.2d 676 (1941); see PROSSER § 76, at 500-03.
'L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868), affg Fletcher v. Rylands, L.R. I Ex. 265 (1866).
"RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 519 (1938).
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"abnormally dangerous"'" activities.' 2 More recently, under the doctrine
of Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. ,'3 manufacturers and sell-
ers have been held strictly liable for damage caused by defective prod-
ucts. "
Strict liability, like liability based on negligence, is limited by the
requirement of actual causation. A defendant cannot be liable unless his
conduct is an actual cause of the plaintiff's harm-that is, unless the
plaintiff would not have been injured but for the defendant's conduct. I5
In many cases, however, both in negligence and strict liability, courts
have found it necessary to adopt a further limitation, a rule that can be
used to distinguish remote from proximate causes, so that a defendant
will not be held responsible for every harmful result of his activities. In
negligence cases, most courts have adopted foreseeability as a criterion
for proximate cause: a defendant is liable only for harm that is a reason-
ably foreseeable result of his negligence." In strict liability, on the other
hand, no such consensus has developed, and courts have approached the
question from several different viewpoints.
Before examining the various approaches that the courts have
taken to the problem of proximate cause in strict-liability cases, it will
be worthwhile to summarize the types of situations in which they have
been faced with this problem. These situations may be divided roughly
into two groups: a group of cases in which the plaintiff's harm did not
result from the risk that led the courts to impose strict liability on the
defendant, and another group in which the plaintiff's injury resulted
from the defendant's conduct in an indirect manner.
Courts usually have not held the defendant liable when the plain-
tiff's injury does not result from the risk for which strict liability is
"RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964).
"E.g., Guilford Realty & Ins. Co. v. Blythe Bros. Co., 260 N.C. 69, 131 S.E.2d 900 (1963);
see PROSSER § 78, at 505-16. The rule of Rylands v. Fletcher is now accepted by about thirty
states. Id. at 509. Many other states have imposed a similar strict liability for abnormally danger-
ous activities under an "absolute nuisance" theory. Id. at 512-13.
359 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
"See 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16A (5th ed. 1970);
PROSSER § 98.
Probably the most important application of strict liability is in the field of workmen's compen-
sation. However, workmen's compensation is not within the scope of this note, as it is based on
statutory provisions rather than common law. For a discussion of the limitations on the extent of
liability in workmen's compensation see Note, Workmen's Compensation-What Is the Range of
Compensable Consequences of a Work-Related Injury? 49 N.C.L. REV. 583 (1971).
"See PROSSER § 41; Byrd, Actual Causation in North Carolina Tort Law, 50 N.C.L. REV.
261 (1972).
"See PROSSER § 43; cf Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
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imposed on the defendant. For example, the owner of trespassing live-
stock is strictly liable for damage that such animals ordinarily do, such
as destruction of grass or crops, 7 or the breeding of a scrub bull with a
pedigreed cow;'8 but ordinarily there is no liability for attacks on peo-
ple. 9 If a person knows that an animal he owns has a vicious propensity,
he is strictly liable for any damage that results from that propensity, 0
but usually not for damage caused by some other propensity of which
he does not know.2' The owner of a wild animal is not liable when it
frightens other animals by its mere appearance. 2 It has been held that
one who engages in an abnormally dangerous activity is strictly liable
only for damage that comes within the risk that makes the activity
abnormally dangerous. Finally, a manufacturer or seller is usually not
liable for harm resulting from a defective product if the consumer has
used it in an abnormal manner.24
The courts have also tended to limit strict liability when the plain-
tiff's harm results too indirectly from the defendant's activity. For in-
stance, when the defendant's cow trespassed in the plaintiff's barn and
broke through the floor, creating a hole into which the plaintiff fell, the
defendant was not held liable.21 Courts have been especially reluctant to
impose liability when there has been an intervening cause. An act of
God, 26 the action of an animal other than defendant's,27 and innocent28
TE.g., Page v. Hollingsworth, 7 Ind. 317 (1855).
jCrawford v. Williams, 48 Iowa 247 (1878); Kopplin v. Quade, 145 Wis. 454, 130 N.W. 511
(1911). See also Hilton v. Overly, 69 Pa. Super. 348, 353 (1918) ("we all know that [boars] almost
invariably attack each other").
"Klenberg v. Russell, 125 Ind. 531, 25 N.E. 596 (1890); Leipske v. Guenther, 7 Wis. 2d 86,
95 N.W.2d 774 (1959); cf. Harvey v. Buchanan, 121 Ga. 384,49 S.E. 281 (1904) (no liability when
trespassing mule attacks goat); Fox v. Koehnig, 190 Wis. 528, 209 N.W. 708 (1926) (no liability
when trespassing horse collides with car). But cf. McKee v. Trisler, 311111. 536, 143 N.E. 69 (1924)
(owner held liable when trespassing bull attacks mule).
10E.g., Zarek v. Fredericks, 138 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1943); Hill v. Moseley, 220 N.C. 485, 17
S.E.2d 676 (1941).
2 E.g., Karlow v. Fitzgerald, 288 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Fowler v. Helck, 278 Ky. 361,
128 S.W.2d 564 (1939).
nBostock-Ferrari Amusement Co. v. Brocksmith, 34 Ind. App. 566, 73 N.E. 281 (1905);
Scribner v. Kelley, 38 Barb. 14 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1862).
2Gronn v. Rogers Construction, Inc., 221 Ore. 226, 350 P.2d 1086 (1960); Foster v. Preston
Mill Co., 44 Wash. 2d 440, 268 P.2d 645 (1954); see Madsen v. East Jordan Irrigation Co., 101
Utah 552, 125 P.2d 794 (1942).
"See notes 57-58 and accompanying text infra.
zHollenbeck v. Johnson, 79 Hun 499, 29 N.Y.S. 945 (Sup. Ct. 1894).
2
'Golden v. Amory, 329 Mass. 484, 109 N.E.2d 131 (1952); Smith v. Board of County Rd.
Comm'rs, 5 Mich. App. 370, 146 N.W.2d 702 (1966), affld, 381 Mich. 363, 161 N.W.2d 561 (1968);
Murphy v. Gillum, 73 Mo. App. 487 (1898) (frost considered act of God); Nichols v. Marsland,
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or negligent" or intentional" intervening conduct by a third person
have all been held by some courts to relieve the defendant of liability.
Although these limitations on the extent of strict liability have not
always been applied in a uniform manner, the approach taken by most
courts, especially in cases involving animals and abnormally dangerous
activities, has been a restrictive one. Courts have refused to find the
defendant liable in situations that would certainly have called for liabil-
ity under the foreseeability test used in negligence cases. In applying the
same-risk limitation-the requirement that the plaintiff's harm result
from the same risk that caused strict liability to be imposed-courts
have often defined the risk narrowly so as not to include the damage
suffered by the plaintiff. For example, in Greeley v. Jameson,3 1 the
defendant's horse kicked the plaintiff and broke his leg. It had bitten
people in the past. The court required the plaintiff to show that the horse
had a propensity to kick people (not just a propensity to attack them)
and ruled that evidence of the earlier biting incidents did not subject the
defendant to strict liability when the horse kicked.3 2 In three cases, 33
the defendants were held not liable when their blasting operations fright-
L.R. 2 Ex. D. 1 (1876).
7Madsen v. East Jordan Irrigation Co., 101 Utah 552, 125 P.2d 794 (1942); Carstairs v.
Taylor, L.R. 6 Ex. 217, 220-21 (1871) (opinion of Kelly, C.B.).
2Kaufman v. Boston Dye House, Inc., 280 Mass. 161, 182 N.E. 297 (1932).
"'See Davis v. Atlas Assurance Co., 112 Ohio St. 543, 147 N.E. 913 (1925); Langabaugh v.
Anderson, 68 Ohio St. 131, 67 N.E. 286 (1903) (alternative holding). In Davis strict liability was
imposed for fires caused by operating railroads. Heat produced by the defendant's engine set fire
to gasoline fumes escaping from a railroad car that an employee of the plaintiff had opened. The
defendant was relieved of liability by the intervening conduct of the plaintiff's employee. In
Langabaugh a landlady leased her land to tenants who drilled for oil. The oil produced was stored
in an elevated tank, but it escaped and flowed down a hill into some open fires. The landlady was
held not liable because she had nothing to do with the storing of the oil, but the court said that
even if this had not been so, still she would have been freed from liability by the tenants' negligence
in failing to take measures against the escape of the oil.
10Cohen v. Brockton Savings Bank, 320 Mass. 690, 71 N.E.2d 109 (1947); cf. Kleebauer v.
Western Fuse & Explosives Co., 138 Cal. 497, 71 P. 617 (1903) (case based on nuisance theory
rather than strict liability); McGhee v. Norfolk & S. Ry., 147 N.C. 142, 60 S.E. 912 (1908) (same).
31265 Mass. 465, 164 N.E. 385 (1929).
"An even more extreme case is Bennett v. Mallard, 33 Misc. 112, 67 N.Y.S. 159 (Sup. Ct.
1900), in which it was held that the owner of a horse that had kicked people before in the road
was not liable when it kicked the plaintiff in its stall.
Ewing v. Prince, 425 S.W.2d 732 (Ky. 1968), held that the owner of a mare that has kicked
other horses is not liable when it kicks a person. In Karlow v. Fitzgerald, 288 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir.
1961), the court ruled that notice that a dog has bumped people is not notice that it will bite.
=Gronn v. Rogers Construction, Inc., 221 Ore. 226, 350 P.2d 1086 (1960); Madsen v. East
Jordan Irrigation Co., 101 Utah 552, 125 P.2d 794 (1942); Foster v. Preston Mill Co., 44 Wash.
2d 440, 268 P.2d 645 (1954).
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ened minks on a mink ranch and caused them to kill their young. The
risk that makes blasting abnormally dangerous was defined narrowly so
as not to cover the harm to the minks.3 1 Just as they have often restric-
tively applied the same-risk limitation, the courts have taken a similar
attitude toward the limitation based on indirect causation, placing an
extreme emphasis on intervening causes. In Kaufman v. Boston Dye
House, Inc.,3 5 the defendant stored a highly inflammable petroleum
product called varnolene on its property-an abnormally dangerous
activity. The varnolene escaped into a creek and caught fire when a
gasoline engine operated by a third party backfired and emitted sparks.
The defendant was held not liable because of the intervening cause. In
similar situations in negligence cases, liability has been found although
there was an intervening negligent"6 or even intentiona3 7 act-whereas
here the act of the third party was not even negligent.
This restrictive approach seems quite unjustified and indeed is in-
consistent with the reasons justifying the concept of strict liability itself.
The purpose of the same-risk limitation is to avoid holding a defendant
liable without negligence when, for instance, he transports explosives
and his vehicle strikes a pedestrian who suddenly darts into his path,3
or when he stores varnolene that escapes from his premises and, instead
of starting a fire, merely turns the plaintiff's grass brown-situations
that could have arisen just as easily if the defendant had been transport-
ing paper or storing ordinary paint. The purpose of the limitation is de-
feated when it is used to relieve a defendant from liability for damage
clearly caused by the dangerousness of his activity or the viciousness of
his animal. If the law requires the owner of an ill-tempered horse to
confine it or pay the price, he should be held liable for all its misconduct,
whether its evil disposition manifests itself by a bite or by a kick.3 1 If
uThis was the rationale used in the Gronn and Foster cases. In Madsen it was held that the
minks' action in killing their young was an intervening cause that relieved the defendant of liability.
1280 Mass. 161, 182 N.E. 297 (1932). It is not entirely clear that this was the actual holding
of the case rather than dictum. The court seems to have been reluctant to impose strict liability at
all because it felt that the varnolene was not sufficiently dangerous. But if there was strict liability,
it ruled, the plaintiff could not recover because of the intervening cause. The opinion does not make
clear upon which of these two grounds the court rested its decision.
31E.g., Watson v. Kentucky & Ind. Bridge & R.R., 137 Ky. 619, 126 S.W. 146 (1910).
3E.g., Richardson v. Ham, 44 Cal. 2d 772, 285 P.2d 269 (1955).
'The illustration is from RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 519, comment e at 54 (Tent.
Draft No. 10, 1964).
"See G. WILLIAMS, LIABILITY FOR ANIMALS 302 (1939): "Would not it be much more satis-
factory to say that any mischievous propensity to draw human blood . is enough?" Professor
Williams' book is a comprehensive analysis of English animal law.
[Vol. 50
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the law requires a blaster to pay for the damage his explosions cause, it
should require him to do so regardless of whether the damage is to
valuable houses or to valuable minks; in each case the damage was
caused by the "non-natural," 4 extraordinary nature of the defendant's
blasting activity,4' and in each case the blaster is equally able to insure
against the loss or pass it on to his customers via higher prices.4 Just
as the purpose of the same-risk limitation is defeated by overly strict
application, the same is true of the intervening-cause limitation. If, as
in Kaufman, one who stores an inflammable substance is not liable
when someone innocently causes it to catch fire, when will he ever be
liable? 3 Fires do not ordinarily start by themselves. Such decisions, as
Harper and James pointed out, "appear almost to subvert the theory
of"" strict liability.
Because the courts enforce the limitations on strict liability so re-
strictively, plaintiffs often find it necessary-as did the plaintiff in
Galbreath v. Engineering Construction Corp . 4-to try to prove negli-
gence on the part of the defendant even though their injuries were caused
by a vicious animal or an abnormally dangerous activity. Only in this
way can the chance of recovery be maximized. Surely this is an
anomalous situation, for whenever the courts impose strict liability they
have determined that the dangerous nature of the defendant's activity
warrants holding him liable even without negligence.
While most courts have adopted a restrictive approach to
proximate cause in strict-liability cases, a few cases reflect a quite differ-
ent tendency in rejecting any limitations at all on strict liability. Deci-
sions from several states have held that the owner of trespassing live-
'
0Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330, 339 (1868).
"Possibly, however, the result reached in the mink-ranch cases can be supported on another
ground-that the plaintiff's minks were abnormally sensitive to the effects of the defendants'
explosions and the plaintiffs were not entitled to special protection for their abnormally sensitive
activity. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 524A (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964) provides that a
plaintiff cannot recover if his harm results from the abnormally sensitive nature of his own activity.
Several courts have adopted such a rule in nuisance cases. E.g., Rogers v. Elliott, 146 Mass. 349,
15 N.E. 768 (1888); Amphitheaters, Inc. v. Portland Meadows, 184 Ore. 336, 198 P.2d 847 (1948).
"Concerning the availability of insurance as a reason for imposing strict liability see Escola
v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 440-41 (1944) (Traynor, J., concur-
ring); PROSSER § 75, at 495.
4A similar situation has arisen in the cases involving reservoirs. See cases cited note 24 supra.
The main danger involved in the storage of water in reservoirs is that the water may overflow or
the dam or dike break in a heavy rainfall. If the rainfall is treated as an act of God that relieves
the defendant of liability, very little is left of this area of strict liability.
12 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 14.5, at 811 (1956).
5 Ind. App.... -, 273 N.E.2d 121, 122 (1971).
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stock is liable for any damage they do, including infection of other
animals with disease" and attacks on other animals47 and people," re-
gardless of whether the owner had notice of their vicious propensities.
Similarly, a Missouri court held the owner of a vicious dog liable when
it became rabid and bit a child, even though a vicious dog is no more
likely than any other dog to catch rabies. 9 Courts in Louisiana"0 and
more recently in Michigan 5' have held the owners of animals strictly
liable despite the presence of intervening causes. The Louisiana court
explained its decision: "There must be security against [wild animals]
under all contingencies. 5 2
Clearly this approach is weighted as heavily on one side as the
prevailing tendency is on the other. If applied consistently to cases
involving abnormally dangerous activities, it would frequently produce
unjust results. A truck driver transporting explosives would be held to
strict liability when he struck a pedestrian who suddenly stepped out
into the street. A trespassing cow or a vicious dog that went to sleep on
a railroad track would subject its owner to strict liability if a train hit
it and derailed. Damage of this sort has nothing to do with the danger
of explosives or the viciousness of the animal, and it seems probable that
if faced with such a case even the courts that have adopted this
unlimited-liability approach would retreat from it.
If the majority of courts have taken an unduly restrictive approach
to the limitations on the extent of strict liability, and a minority have
taken an impossibly liberal approach, then there is a need for a middle
ground, a third alternative that will avoid the weaknesses of both. The
significance of the Galbreath case is that it adopts such an alternative.
The Galbreath court could have followed the mink-ranch cases and held
that only damage caused by flying debris and vibrations lie within the
risk that makes blasting abnormally dangerous. Or, following
Kaufman, it could have held that the operation of the backhoe engine
was an intervening cause that relieved defendant from strict liability.
But it refused to do so, holding instead that the extent of liability in
"Lee v. Burk, 15 111. App. 651 (1884).
"
t Decker v. Gammon, 44 Me. 322 (1857); Morgan v. Hudnell, 52 Ohio St. 552, 40 N.E. 716
(1895); Chunot v. Larson, 43 Wis. 536 (1878).
"Malone v. Knowlton, 15 N.Y.S. 506 (Sup. Ct. 1891); Nixon v. Harris, 15 Ohio St. 2d 105,
238 N.E.2d 785 (1968).
4
'Clinkenbeard v. Reinert, 284 Mo. 569, 225 S.W. 667 (1920).
OVredenburg v. Behan, 33 La. Ann. 627 (1881).
"Johnson v. Robinson, 11 Mich. App. 707, 162 N.W.2d 161 (1968) (per curiam).
5 2Vredenburg v. Behan, 33 La. Ann. 627, 634 (1881).
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strict-liability cases should be governed by the same rules that control
in negligence cases.53 Thus, instead of asking whether the burning of
escaping gas was within the risk for which strict liability is imposed on
blasters, it asked whether such an accident was foreseeable;54 similarly,
in dealing with the intervening cause, it asked whether the presence of
an "igniting agent, such as a backhoe engine,"55 was foreseeable. Its
answer was that these occurrences were not unforeseeable as a matter
of law. Therefore, it ruled, defendant's demurrer was improperly sus-
tained and the case should have gone to the jury. 6
The Galbreath court's use of the term "foreseeability" is not un-
precedented. Many courts have used the terminology of negligence law
in cases involving animals and abnormally dangerous activities. But
Galbreath is the first case that has adopted the foreseeability test after
careful consideration of the alternatives and proceeded to apply it with
the same liberality that courts use in negligence cases.57
The approach that the Indiana court adopted for abnormally dan-
gerous activities is the same approach that courts generally have fol-
lowed in cases imposing strict liability for defective products. At first
glance it seems surprising that courts have taken a different approach
to strict liability for defective products than for other types of strict-
liability cases, but the reason is not hard to find. Originally negligence
was the basis of liability for defective products. Since then, products-
liability law has passed from negligence to warranty to strict liability,
as the courts have increased the duty of the manufacturer or seller from
the ordinary duty of using reasonable care to the much more rigorous
duty of actually eliminating all defects that may cause injury.58 But while
'3The approach taken by the Galbreath court is similar to the one advocated in Harper,
Liability Without Fault and Proximate Cause, 30 MICH. L. REV. 1001 (1932).
5._ Ind. App. at - 273 N.E.2d at 124-27.
51d. at 273 N.E.2d at 128.
Old. at -, 273 N.E.2d at 129.
"A few isolated cases dealing with vicious animals have applied the foreseeability test in the
same realistic manner as in Galbreath but without the full discussion of the question that is found
in the Galbreath opinion. Reynolds v. Hussey, 64 N.H. 64, 5 A. 458 (1886); Stamp v. Eighty-Sixth
St. Amusement Co., 95 Misc. 599, 159 N.Y.S. 683 (Sup. Ct. 1916); Cockerham v. Nixon, 33 N.C.
269 (1850).
O'This transition, like most changes in legal doctrine, has been a gradual process, and in many
states it has not yet been completed. For instance, in North Carolina the strict-liability rule of
Greenman has not been followed. Even the concept of implied warranty has been limited to cases
in which the plaintiff and defendant are in privity of contract and to cases involving certain specific
classes of products, including foods in sealed containers and advertised products. Compare Terry
v. Double Cola Bottling Co., 263 N.C. 1, 138 S.E.2d 753 (1964), with Tedder v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling
Co., 270 N.C. 301, 154 S.E.2d 337 (1967).
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the level of duty has been raised substantially, the other provisions of
products-liability law have not undergone great change. The rules per-
taining to abnormal use and those determining when a manufacturer is
relieved of liability by the seller's negligence were not found unsatisfac-
tory in the negligence cases, and so the courts did not hesitate in carry-
ing them over into warranty and strict liability. As a result, regardless
of the theory on which liability is based, a manufacturer or seller is free
from liability when the plaintiff's injury is caused by his unforeseeable
abnormal use of a product-9 but not when the abnormal use can be
foreseen by the defendant." Again regardless of the theory used, a
manufacturer is liable despite the foreseeable intervening negligence of
a seller or some other third party,"' though there may be an exception
when the seller discovers the defect in the product and nevertheless
delivers it to the plaintiff without warning him of the defect. 2
Surely the approach adopted in Galbreath and the products-
liability cases is much superior to either of the other two viewpoints the
North Carolina products-liability law has been changed by the adoption of § 2-318 of the
Uniform Commercial Code. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-318 (1965). This section provides that the
seller of any defective product is liable for resulting personal injuries to the buyer, anyone in his
family or household, or any guest in his home.
51E.g., Schfranek v. Benjamin Moore & Co., 54 F.2d 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1931) (negligence); Preston
v. Up-Right, Inc., 243 Cal. App. 2d 636, 52 Cal. Rptr. 679 (1966) (strict liability); Vincent v.
Nicholas E. Tsiknas Co., 337 Mass. 726, 151 N.E.2d 263 (1958) (warranty).
6E.g., Phillips v. Ogle Aluminum Furniture, Inc., 106 Cal. App. 2d 650, 235 P.2d 857 (1951)
(negligence); Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 86 II1. App. 2d 315, 229 N.E.2d 684
(1967), affd, 42 I11. 2d 339, 247 N.E.2d 401 (1969) (strict liability); McSpedon v. Kunz, 271 N.Y.
131, 2 N.E.2d 513 (1936) (warranty).
6 E.g., Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 III. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965) (strict liability:
plaintiff collided with bus while driving truck with defective brakes which were manufactured by
defendant; passengers in bus injured and plaintiff compensated them for their injuries; held, plain-
tiff entitled to indemnity from defendant); Steele v. Rapp, 183 Kan. 371, 327 P.2d 1053 (1958)
(negligence: defendant sold fingernail polish remover without warning that it was explosive; plain-
tiff injured when fellow employee negligently dropped jar of it).
6 The seller's discovery of the defect usually has been held to relieve the manufacturer of
liability for negligence. E.g., Stultz v. Benson Lumber Co., 6 Cal. 2d 688, 59 P.2d 100 (1936); Ford
Motor Co. v. Wagoner, 183 Tenn. 392, 192 S.W.2d 840 (1946). Virtually no warranty or strict-
liability cases have dealt with the question, but Professor Prosser has suggested that the same rules
will be followed in these cases as in the negligence cases. PROSSER § 102, at 668; cf. 2 L. FRUMER
& M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, § 16.01[4], at 3-32 (criterion should always be whether the
intervening conduct is foreseeable).
In California it has been held that a manufacturer cannot avoid strict liability for a defective
product by delegating the final stages of manufacturing and inspection to a seller. Thus he will
not be relieved of liability by the seller's discovery of a defect, or by anything else the seller "did
or failed to do." Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 261, 391 P.2d 168, 171, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 896, 899 (1964).
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courts have taken. Still, before concluding that it is the best approach
and the one that all courts should follow, there is one other approach
that should be examined, that adopted by the Restatement (Second) of
Torts.13 The Restatement's rules for limiting strict liability for defective
products 4 and trespassing livestock are fairly similar to those used in
Galbreath and the products-liability cases. However, the Restatement
differs from Galbreath in two important ways in its approach to strict
liability for wild and vicious animals and abnormally dangerous activi-
ties. First, the Restatement restricts strict liability for abnormally dan-
gerous activities to "the kind of harm, the risk of which makes the
activity abnormally dangerous,"6 and it limits the liability for vicious
animals to "harm which results from the abnormal dangerous propens-
ity of which the possessor knows or has reason to know"; 7 in other
words, it adopts the same-risk limitation that Galbreath rejected in
favor of a foreseeability test. Secondly, the Restatement makes no pro-
vision for any limitation on liability based on indirectness of causation.
In fact, two sections explicitly call for liability even when there is an
unforeseeable intervening cause.6
Is there a need for a limitation based on indirectness of causation?
The comments to the Restatement argue that because persons carrying
on abnormally dangerous activities or keeping dangerous animals "have
thereby for their own purposes created a risk which is not a usual
incident of the ordinary life of the community,"69 it is irrelevant whether
"The sections of the Restatement (Second) of Torts dealing'with strict liability have not yet
been published in final form. Several sections are unchanged from the first Restatement and appear
there in the third volume. The sections that have been changed are included in RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964). See 41 ALI PROCEEDINGS 397484 (1964), a
transcript of the American Law Institute meeting at which the proposed changes were considered.
"
4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
ORESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 504 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964). The changes in this
section were approved by the American Law Institute. 41 ALI PROCEEDINGS 419-34 (1964).
"'RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 519(2) (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964.).
171d. § 509(2). Strict liability for wild animals is similarly limited in RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS § 507 (1938), which is unchanged in the Restatement Second.
"RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 510, 522 (1938). The American Law Institute rejected the
changes that Prosser, the Reporter for the Restatement Second, proposed in these sections.
Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 510, Note to Institute at 32 (Tent. Draft No. 10,
1964), and id. § 522, Note to Institute at 82, with 41 ALI PROCEEDINGS 41941 (1964).
In two Caveats the Restatement leaves open the question whether a defendant should be
relieved of liability by the intentional act of a third person who deliberately sets out to cause the
injury to the plaintiff which in fact occurs. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 510, 522 (1938). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 524A (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964), holding that a defendant
is not liable for harm caused by the abnormally sensitive nature of the plaintiff's activity.
"RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 522, comment a at 48 (1938). This section is concerned specifi-
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the risk materializes in a foreseeable or unforeseeable manner. In addi-
tion, a second argument can be made in support of this position. When
a defendant is held liable for foreseeable harm caused by his negligence,
it is because the law considers him to have acted wrongfully in failing
to provide against a risk of harm to others that he has created. When
he is relieved of liability for unforeseeable harm, it is because he could
not be expected to provide against a risk the existence of which he could
never have realized. But strict liability is based on an entirely different
ground; it is in the nature of an abnormally dangerous activity that a
person cannot provide against the risks involved-without abandoning
the activity, which the law does not require him to do. Instead, strict
liability is based on a requirement that the defendant make compensa-
tion for any harm that his activity causes. The courts allow him to
engage in his dangerous activity only on condition that he pay for all
harm done, a condition that has nothing to do with foreseeability.
There is an answer to these arguments, however. It is based on the
belief that the courts should not deal more harshly with conduct the law
allows than with conduct the law condemns. Consider a type of negli-
gent activity, such as drunken driving. This conduct is often at least as
dangerous as an abnormally dangerous activity or the keeping of an
abnormally dangerous animal. When an intoxicated person drives a car,
he has certainly "for [his] own purposes created a risk which is not a
usual incident of the ordinary life of the community"; 0 and he is unable
to provide against this risk, except by ceasing to drive while drunk. In
other words, he is in virtually the same situation as one who carries on
an abnormally dangerous activity. The only difference is that the law
does not require a person to refrain from abnormally dangerous activi-
ties, but it does require a person to refrain from driving while drunk.
Yet a drunken driver is not liable for the unforeseeable results of his
negligent activity. Why should a broader liability be imposed by the
courts on a person whose activity is permitted because it is socially
beneficial despite its risks than on a person who creates a risk that is
completely unjustified? As Professor Albert A. Ehrenzweig explained,
strict liability is a substitute for negligence; courts give permission to
engage in an activity instead of labeling it negligent, but "strict liability
is the price an entrepreneur must pay for that permission. . . . IT]hat
cally with abnormally dangerous activities. Similar language is used in connection with dangerous
animals at id. § 510, comment a at 24.
7
°RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 522, comment a at 48 (1938).
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liability extends to all harm for the infliction of which he would be liable
but for the permission . . . no less-no more."7'
As for the Restatement's other difference from the Galbreath ap-
proach-the adoption of the same-risk limitation-this is certainly not
a point in its favor. There is nothing wrong with the same-risk limitation
as such, but, as discussed previously, it has been misapplied in cases such
as Greeley v. Jameson72 and the mink-ranch cases,73 and thus it carries
with it a series of dubious precedents. The foreseeability rule can ade-
quately serve the same purpose as the same-risk rule (discoloring a
neighbor's lawn is not a foreseeable result of storing an inflammable
liquid; hitting a pedestrian who runs into the road is not a foreseeable
result of transporting explosives) and it does not bear the burden of
these unfortunate precedents. 74
Thus the Galbreath approach is not only preferable to the restric-
tive and the unlimited-liability approaches; it also proves superior to
that of the Restatement on both their points of difference. Hopefully
future cases will adopt the Galbreath viewpoint, for that approach seems
to be the best method for confining strict liability within reasonable
limits while at the same time ensuring that technical and arbitrary
distinctions will not deprive plaintiffs of its benefits.
ROBERT STARR GILLAM
71A. EHRENZWEIG, NEGLIGENCE WITHOUT FAULT 50 (1951).
72265 Mass. 465, 164 N.E. 385 (1929).
7"The Restatement endorses the mink-ranch cases. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519,
Note to Institute at 52 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964).
"It has been pointed out that the foreseeability rule is applied in a different manner in strict-
liability cases than in negligence cases. In the latter, the question is whether "the risk can be
foreseen at the time of the negligent act"; in strict liability, on the other hand, the defendant is
liable if "the risk of harm can be seen at the time of embarking upon the activity." Note, Strict
Products Liability and the Bystander, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 916, 935 (1964).
1972]
K---' -- - -1 -- -1 , 4i
FRANK W. HANFT
This issue of the North Carolina Law Review is dedicated to Gra-
ham Kenan Professor of Law Frank W. Hanft, who is retiring this year
after forty-one years at the School of Law.
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